

# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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# The American Trade Proposals: Restrictive Business Practices

Article by ROBERT P. TERRILL

## Introduction

THE CHARACTERISTICS of international cartels and their growth during the inter-war period have been the subject of numerous private and official inquiries which, since 1939, have been substantially augmented in the United States by governmental investigations and judicial proceedings. The purpose of this article is to discuss the bearing of this extensive body of information, in some of its aspects, upon international commercial policy, with particular reference to the proposals concerning restrictive business practices set forth in the *Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment* (Department of State Publication 411).<sup>1</sup>

Considered as a whole, the information and analysis now available disclose as of 1939 the cumulative spread of a network of restrictive business arrangements and practices affecting a substantial proportion of all international trade in economic goods, including industrial technology. Individual fields of production and trade were not, of course, equally or invariably subjected to such restrictions, nor were all arrangements of uniform durability and effectiveness. Nevertheless, the significance of this development with reference to international commercial policy is clear and unmistakable: On the eve of the outbreak of the recent war the cartelization of world trade had reached proportions sufficient to threaten the international economic processes of competition which underlie the multilateral system of world trade and which have been significantly responsible for its development in the past several centuries of unrivaled material progress. The United Nations consequently face today an urgent problem whose solution is related to the success of efforts in other fields of economic and monetary

policy; and the relation is clearly one of mutual interdependence. On the one hand, concerted action to curb the restrictive business of international cartels would be largely fruitless in the absence of complementary measures for reducing governmentally imposed barriers to trade and for the establishing of a multilateral system of international payments. On the other hand, the success of such measures depends upon the competitive character and vitality of the underlying processes of business and international trade.

## Effects of International Cartels

International cartels may be characterized, for purposes of this discussion, as arrangements between producers situated in two or more countries for the elimination or suppression of competition. Firms enter into cartels in order to obtain the advantages of monopolistic control expected to accrue in the form of higher prices and profits per unit of sales than would otherwise be realized. In order to achieve this objective, cartels must succeed in restricting sales to a smaller quantity than would have prevailed in the absence of an agreement. This result is known in terms of the art as the "adjustment of supply to demand". More exactly, by concerted control of production and marketing—either or both—supply is "adjusted" to demand at a non-competitive price.

The forms assumed in practice by cartel arrangements are exceedingly varied, depending from agreement to agreement upon the characteristics of each industry within the various producing and consuming countries at any given time. Typ-

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<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 9, 1945, p. 913.

ically, however, a written agreement sets forth the various restraints which each party will undertake as to his producing and marketing activities, and provides for such ancillary matters as penalties. In an industry based upon technology subject to patents in various national jurisdictions, it is customary to agree upon licenses within given countries with respect to both existing and future patents coming under the control of the parties and, where relevant, to provide for the exchange of non-patentable or confidential information.

Cartel agreements are frequently reinforced by international combines which subject firms in different countries to unified control, principally through stock-ownership by a single concern. Such a concern is generally known as the "parent" and often takes the form of a holding company. International combines thus facilitate the negotiation and maintenance of cartel arrangements by reducing the number of contracting parties necessary to obtain effective control over an industry. In the revival of autarchic trade practices during the 1930's, private cartel agreements were also reinforced in some countries by governmental action to assign compulsory production or export quotas to firms within their respective national jurisdiction, and in some cases to assign import quotas to foreign concerns. Also, the simultaneous fixing of official quotas for a given product by two or more countries, in consultation with their respective industrial groups, sometimes accomplished the *de facto* results of an international cartel without its *de jure* organization.

The practices of international cartels are likewise extremely varied, and the adoption of a number of interrelated practices is typically required in cartel agreements. Certain agreements provide for the explicit fixing of price in some or all markets of the world, while others seek to accomplish this result indirectly by means of production or export quotas which in turn may be global in character or may pertain to particular national markets. The assignment of exclusive market areas to each of the cartel participants illustrates still another variant; by means of such allocations members are restricted to specified national territories with the object of insuring to each party exclusive possession of a given market area. If, as in some instances, unreserved or non-exclusive territories coexist, the members may agree on which firm shall act as the price "leader", or they

may agree upon a common and exclusive sales agency or a division of exclusive customers.

The concerted boycott illustrates another type of restrictive business practice and is employed for the purpose of coercing "outside" sellers or buyers. In this instance a group of firms in the position of buyers or sellers with respect to "outsiders" refuses, or threatens to refuse, to do business with the latter unless certain conditions are accepted. For example, retail dealers have been faced with boycott by cartel groups unless they refrain from trading with independent producers seeking sales outlets. Concerted "dumping" in a given market is a related practice whose purpose is to preclude the future competition of outsiders or to prevent the establishment of new firms.

Concerted action to restrict access to technology has been required under exclusive arrangements for the pooling of future as well as existing patents in the control of a particular group of firms. In certain instances where the parties possess important improvement and application patents as well as "basic" patents, the expiration of the latter is of no benefit to outside firms if they cannot have access on reasonable terms to patents relating to mere applications and improvements. In general, this type of restraint extends the combined monopoly powers of the parties beyond the legal grant of a monopoly inherent in their patents at any given time. Firms in possession of patents, particularly those relating to general processes of production, may also divide or allocate fields of production through restrictive licensing agreements, each licensee being arbitrarily limited to a particular and different use of the process. Such an allocation of fields of production is not necessarily independent, of course, upon the existence of patents; it may be achieved directly by agreement to such effect, or indirectly by agreed allocation of market areas or customers having different demand characteristics.

International cartel arrangements may affect economic welfare through monopolistic influence upon production and the distribution of income and upon the flow of international trade. The monopoly consequences of an international cartel agreement are similar to those induced by restriction on a purely domestic scale. The quantity of resources, including labor, used in the cartelized industry tends to be less than it would be under a non-restrictionist regime, although prices negoti-



profits per unit of output tend to be correspondingly greater. Resources used in competitive sectors of the economy earn smaller returns than they would otherwise have been the case; and owing to collateral effects on the distribution of income, the volume of savings may be increased with respect to opportunities for new investment, thus resulting in a tendency toward chronic unemployment. The monopolistic effects of cartels may also extend to the retardation and smothering of new techniques of production and innovations of management or marketing. It is a widely held opinion that the cartelization of an industry diminishes the incentives of firms to be enterprising and may, indeed, lead to the deliberate suppression of technology. The extent to which this proves to be the case in any given instance is, of course, exceedingly difficult to estimate, particularly over any short period of time, due to the lack of a suitable standard of reference.

The existence of political frontiers and diverse national economies greatly complicates the monopolistic effects of international cartels and introduces additional considerations, mainly with reference to the terms of trade between national states. International cartel agreements between producers situated in predominantly industrial countries may influence the terms of trade of such countries with less industrialized nations to the detriment of the welfare of the latter. If such restrictive arrangements are governmentally encouraged, political relations may likewise deteriorate and give rise to retaliatory action. If such action takes the form of cartelization of the export products of the less industrialized nations, the terms of trade of the latter may be restored; however, the total volume of world trade will be diminished, and the supply of international items entering into the standard of living will be correspondingly diminished.

Restrictive arrangements in a particular industry may also induce the growth of firms producing identical or substitute commodities in dependent consuming countries. If such expansion is sufficiently great, the cartel arrangement in question may ultimately break down with a drastic decline in price and accompanying demands for governmental measures to protect the newly created productive capacity regardless of comparative costs. Similarly, as a preliminary to the negotiation or renewal of cartel agreements, pro-

ducers situated in a given country may demand, or threaten to demand, a protective tariff or other governmental trade barriers for the purpose of increasing their "bargaining power" by eliminating their domestic market as an object in the cartel negotiations. The monopoly effects of international cartels are thus closely related to the subject of trade barriers.

Although it is perhaps true that international cartels, through private quota arrangements, have on occasion forestalled the enactment of governmental import regulations, it should also be noted that the cartel participants in such cases derive, at least in part, returns which would otherwise have accrued to the public treasury in the form of import duties or proceeds from the sale of import licenses. Furthermore, if markets are exclusively allocated under a cartel arrangement, the effect is tantamount to an absolute prohibition of imports. A cartel can thus be more drastic in its restrictive effects than an official quota or tariff and even when less restrictive will result in a loss of revenue that would otherwise accrue to the public treasury. In the case of states which are wholly or mainly dependent upon foreign sources of supply an additional consideration is relevant, namely, the burden of being arbitrarily denied the right to purchase from the cheapest seller and thus to obtain the advantages of competition. This effect of cartel control is of importance since almost all countries, because of natural or economic circumstances, are highly dependent upon certain imports.

The effect of concerted and inequitable restraints upon access to new industrial technology has been less widely noted but is, nevertheless, of importance. Cartel arrangements in the field of technology may not only retard the growth and improvement of an industry but may also frustrate the greatest potential use of the growing international fund of scientific knowledge which provides the basis for subsequent technological developments and which is truly a common world possession. In this connection, however, it should be emphasized that the development of new industrial technology is necessarily costly and time consuming, and frequently entails high risks of failure on the part of individual firms. The prospect of adequate monetary returns is therefore essential to sustain this important function of enterprise in every country. An effective world system of national patent grants with proper scope

for cooperation among governments is indispensable to the continued development and wide international dissemination of industrial technology.

### Considerations of Policy

Certain popular statements which present the differences of national policies toward international cartels in sharp contrasts of black and white may easily be misleading. In the first place, individual governmental policies concerning cartels have not, with few exceptions, been subject to clear and definitive expression. General inferences in this matter are frequently drawn from special situations prevailing in the late 1930's or from some particular provision of national legislation that may not adequately reflect the general body of national statutes bearing upon the subject. For example, although a country may have no general legislation against restraint of trade, it may as in some states have certain "antitrust" provisions written into its patent or trade-mark laws. Consequently, it would perhaps be more accurate to emphasize the extreme complexity of this legislative field and to draw attention to the shadings of emphasis on matters treated in the various national systems.

Secondly, pre-war attitudes, while of course relevant to post-war policies, are not necessarily determinative in full measure, particularly with reference to restrictive business practices of an international character. The national legislation of most countries, including those which presume the legality of monopolistic combinations, was, generally speaking, conceived before the recent growth of international arrangements and was framed primarily with reference to domestic market relations. Since unilateral action, particularly on the part of smaller states, would have been hopelessly inadequate to curb restrictive business practices of an international character, previous legislation may not adequately reflect the attitude of all countries under changed circumstances. Given the prospect of an agreed international standard and

other measures permitting freedom of choice, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the trading countries of the world would elect to prevent and otherwise curb those restrictive business practices which burden commerce and thwart the operation of a multilateral system of trade.

Cooperative action among governments to curb restrictive business practices in international trade requires mutual recognition of the need for such action and agreement to take individual and collective measures to meet the need.<sup>1</sup> The agreement in question might take either of two alternative forms.

One form of agreement would consist of a specific list of restrictive business practices in international trade which the participating governments would regard as *ipso facto* violations. This list would be added to or modified in view of later experience. The other form would include a similar list of practices, but each cooperating government would consider them only *prima facie* violations.

The salient feature of the first form of agreement is that each participating government would agree in advance: (1) that specifically defined business practices resulting from or intended by arrangements between two or more commercial enterprises engaged in international trade are illegal and (2) that each government would, upon demonstration that such practices existed, take measures either individually or in concert to remove or eliminate them. A list of such practices might include price fixing, division of markets, limitation of production or exports, suppression of technology, boycotting, and other restraints. The agreement might also provide for an international agency to facilitate uniform national actions and otherwise assist member governments but such an agency would not necessarily be an active element in the plan.

If such an agreement were adopted and promptly implemented by the signatory governments, it would result in a high degree of certainty and uniformity in prohibiting international restrictive business practices. Success would seem to be remote, however, in getting each participating government to agree to incorporate into its existing laws uniform definitions of restrictive business practices, even if such definitions were

<sup>1</sup> The late President Roosevelt in a letter to Secretary of State Hull pointed out the necessity for curbing cartels, the text of which was printed in BULLETIN of Sept. 10, 1944, p. 254; Mr. Hull's reply appeared in the BULLETIN of Sept. 17, 1944, p. 292. For statements on the subject by Assistant Secretary Clayton see BULLETIN of April 8, 1945, p. 613, May 20, 1945, p. 933. For an address on cartels by Charles Bunn see BULLETIN of Oct. 15, 1944, p. 433.

# German Documents on Sumner Welles Mission, 1940

## The Führer

### DIRECTIONS FOR THE CONFERENCES WITH MR. SUMNER WELLES

1. In general I request that on the German side in the conferences reserve be maintained and so far as possible the course of the conversation be left to Mr. Sumner Welles.

2. As regards relations between Germany and the United States it may be stated that the present situation is not satisfactory to either people. The Government of the Reich had on its part given no cause for the relations between the two countries developing as they had. If the American Government, by sending Mr. Sumner Welles to Berlin,<sup>1</sup> intended to produce a change in the situation, that would undoubtedly be in the interest of both peoples.

3. The point of view of Germany in regard to the international situation and the war has been made known to the world by my speeches. On individual points the following can be stated:

Germany did not declare war on the Western Powers but they declared war on Germany.

England and France had no just ground for war against Germany. Just as the United States on the ground of the Monroe Doctrine would sharply reject any intervention by a European Government, for example in Mexican affairs, so Germany regarded the eastern European area as its sphere of interest, about which it would negotiate only with Russia but never with England and France. Germany, after the conclusion of the Polish campaign, had negotiated with Russia on eastern questions and had through this unavoidable change in the situation in the east finally made its European position secure. Then at the beginning of October I once more made a last peace offer to England and France. Both countries had made the greatest mistake which they could make. They regarded this offer as a sign of weakness and rejected it with scorn.

Germany had accordingly drawn the only possible conclusion. She accepted the challenge of England and France.

In the interval, the war aims of England and France had become more clear. These consisted, as had now been stated openly, in the destruction of the German state and the dismembering of the German people in an even worse Versailles System. As the result of this course of events Germany as the state attacked had nothing to say on the subject of peace. Germany was immovable in her decision to break once and for all the will to destruction which now controlled English and French policy and the force of a population of eighty million was aimed to that end. Only when the English and French will to destruction is broken can a new truly and peaceful Europe be built. While with unparalleled deception England and France proclaimed ever more openly as their war aim the destruction of Germany and a new partition of Europe into peoples with and without rights, Germany even today does not declare for the destruction of the British Empire and of France. Germany sees rather the guaranty for a consolidation in Europe to lie in satisfying the vital interests of the great peoples in their own natural living areas, while there is a place in Europe both for the small states who have historically displayed their capacity for existence, as well as for the great states. Germany considers that this end can be obtained only through her victory.

4. On economic questions it may be stated that the English blockade is not of decisive importance

These documents regarding former Under Secretary of State Welles' mission to Germany in 1940, secured from German Government files, are among the first of German official papers which the BULLETIN is now publishing; others will appear in later issues. For an article on and excerpts from a German handbook of propaganda directives, see BULLETIN of Feb. 24, 1946, p. 278, Mar. 3, 1946, p. 311, and Mar. 10, 1946, p. 365.

These documents have been selected and translated by J. S. Beddie, research assistant, Division of Research and Publication, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 30, 1940, p. 335.



for Germany. Germany can, both in connection with its needs for provisions as well as for its needs of raw materials by means of its own independent economy and through its trade with the European states, with Russia, and by way of Russia, with Japan and the larger part of the world, make any blockade useless. National Socialist Germany is in no way set against a world economy. Her building up of an independent economy has been forced upon her through the economic policies of the world. Its completion which now approaches, will, however, put Germany in a position to take part again as a healthy partner in world economy.

5. A discussion of individual concrete political questions, as, for example, the question of a future Polish state, is, if possible, to be avoided. In case that sort of subject is brought up on the other side, reply is to be made that such questions are to be decided by me. It goes without saying that the

subjects always being brought up by England and France of Austria and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia are to be excluded from any discussion.

6. Reference can be made to the completely altered political situation of Germany as compared with 1914. All references are to be avoided, which on the other side could be construed as indicating that Germany has any interest at present in the exploration of possibilities of peace. It is requested rather that Mr. Sumner Welles be not left in the slightest doubt that Germany is determined to conclude this war victoriously, and that the confidence in victory of the German people, united as never before in their thousand years of history, and that of their leadership, is unbreakable.

ADOLF HITLER

29 February 1940.

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#### MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN FIELD MARSHAL GOERING AND UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE SUMNER WELLES AT KARIN HALL, MARCH 3, 1940

Sumner Welles began the conversation, just as in his conferences with the Führer, the Foreign Minister, and the Deputy of the Führer, to which conferences he referred briefly, with almost the same words as in those conversations concerning the nature and purpose of his mission in Europe. President Roosevelt had directed him to undertake a trip to Italy, Germany, France, and England in order to make a report about the present situation in Europe and about any possibilities of bringing about a firm and lasting peace in Europe. President Roosevelt had no interest in a temporary or uncertain condition of peace, but only in permanent peace which would guarantee permanent security to all peoples. Sumner Welles emphasized that he would treat any information given him by European statesmen in strictest confidence and to be regarded as solely for the information of President Roosevelt. In conclusion he added that he had not been empowered to make any proposals or suggestions.

He referred to his long conversation with the Duce in Rome, which he described as constructive and beneficial. Although, as the result of the forementioned confidential character of his conversations with the European statesmen, he could give

no details about his conference with the Duce, he would go so far as to say that in the opinion of the Duce there still existed the possibility of bringing about a lasting and firm peace in Europe. It was the opinion of the American Government that a war of annihilation could cost not only millions of human lives, but would also bring about the destruction of the social order and of the greater part of the material advantages which civilization had accumulated in past ages. For this reason the American Government hoped that there was still time to find ways and means of insuring a just political peace on permanent and strong bases. If there was this possibility, America, according to the public declaration of President Roosevelt, would take its full part in all plans which might be worked out for reduction of armaments consistent with the security requirements of the nations as well as in all measures for the restoration of economic life which might likewise be suited to bring about security and stability of conditions in that field. It was in this spirit that he had come to Europe and he would be grateful to learn the views of the Field Marshal.

Field Marshal Goering replied that in order to take a correct position with regard to the ques-



tions that had been mentioned it was necessary, first, to go somewhat more deeply, in order to show how the development from past conditions had come about.

When National Socialism had come into power and the original bases of its foreign policy had been laid down, the Führer, as well as the Field Marshal himself, had clearly stated the two underlying principles which would be emphasized in German foreign policy: (1) the traditional friendship with Italy, which already existed as a result of their common world outlook; and (2) the closest and more intimate collaboration with the British Empire. This latter principle would be put into operation as soon as possible. There began an actual wooing of England, and as on later occasions from other sources the opinion was expressed that England could not be trusted and that one should act more carefully with respect to England, the Führer firmly rejected this viewpoint and indicated that the policy in regard to England must be continued under all circumstances. England had great obligations to meet in the defense of her Empire, while Germany in the continental area of Europe must on her side represent a stabilizing factor. Everything possible would be done to make the collaboration with England a reality. All of the leading personalities of England, who in the following years frequently visited Germany, were convinced that it would be folly and a crime if England and Germany should be brought once more into war with each other, that the World War must remain the first and last warlike conflict between the two nations and that the interests of the two countries were the same. The Führer even went so far, in his desire to collaborate with England, that he was prepared to guarantee the existence of the British Empire by the aid of German arms.

The England of MacDonald and later of Baldwin was somewhat unreceptive and people there seemed not to understand the German desire for *rapprochement*, raising the objection that there were binding obligations to France. Thereupon the Führer declared himself ready to make an agreement with France as well. It was of course somewhat bitter and difficult for him to give up finally any claim to Alsace-Lorraine in order to secure an agreement with France and thereby with England. With respect to France, the only condi-

tion put forward was a satisfactory solution of the Saar question.

In order to remove difficulties still further, the Führer made proposals for disarmament, which, as is known, envisaged an army of 200,000 to 300,000 men. At the same time Polish-German relations were improved, which at the time the National Socialists came into power were extraordinarily critical.

In connection with the endeavor to secure an agreement with England, Herr von Ribbentrop was employed, since he already had the very best connections with England. In order to carry out this task which was entrusted to him by the Führer, an office of his own was set up which brought prominent Englishmen to Germany, to assist in this way the *rapprochement* of the two countries.

Germany had only limited aims: the consolidation of the Reich, the elimination of the Versailles Treaty, and her own security. When Ambassador von Hoesch died, Herr von Ribbentrop was sent as Ambassador to London with the express task of improving German-English relationships. He had already concluded the naval agreement with England, in which the Führer had made the great concession that the strength of the German fleet should be only 35 percent of that of England. Only if one knew how very close German sea power lay to the heart of the Führer and how he had always had it in mind that Germany would once again have a strong Navy, could one conceive how really great the personal sacrifice was, which the German-English naval agreement represented, for the improvement of German-English relations.

It was true that in England some individuals had a correct understanding of the situation. Official England, however, and the people who molded public opinion, received these plans for *rapprochement* with a negative attitude, and that at a time when there could have been no aspirations for power on the part of Germany. The German efforts to come to an agreement with England had all been rejected, and not on reasonable grounds. That could perhaps have been understood. Also not in gentlemanly terms, but with scorn and disdain and with insults directed against the leading German personalities. It had often been hard for Germany to continue on the friendly course as respects England, and the advisers of the Führer were often astonished that in spite of everything he

held fast to his goal of collaboration with England. Certainly there had been brief periods of disturbance in German-English relationships, but the Führer had always come back again to his original policy toward England.

Field Marshal Goering turned then to other fields of recent history. He referred to the occupation of the Rhineland which represented only the realization of the primal rights of a people to exercise complete sovereignty over its entire territory. He spoke of Austria, a country which except for a few Jews was inhabited entirely by Germans, which wanted to return to the Reich, and which as early as 1918 through its popular assembly had expressed its will to do so, which decision had at that time been overruled by the Entente. It was therefore absolutely provocative when M. Daladier now declared that the Austrian question would have to be taken up again. It was just as if one of the states of the United States had, as a result of an unfortunate war, been detached from the United States and then reunited and a foreign politician would declare that the situation of separation would have to be restored again. One might just as well talk about the detachment of Bavaria and Württemberg.

Passing to the Czech question, the Field Marshal noted that there were two matters involved here: first, the question of nationality. Through pressure from all sides the Sudeten-German question had been solved at Munich. A guaranty of the remainder of Czechoslovakia had been considered there. He, the Field Marshal, had been against the idea and the Führer rejected it on the ground that there must first come about an arrangement between the Czechs and the Slovaks, the Hungarians and the Poles, and that additionally, further internal developments in Czechoslovakia must take place.

One came then to the second point in connection with Czechoslovakia, the question of security. In order to understand this properly, Sumner Welles should cut out a representation of the former Czechoslovakia on a map and place it touching part of the boundary of the United States so that it lay within United States territory. Then he could understand how great a danger Czechoslovakia in its previous form represented for Germany. Like a spear point it threatened the heart of Germany, lying only 20 minutes by air from the capital and from the important centers of

industry and transport arteries. What responsible head of a state could endure such a situation, especially since this enclave within Germany was unfriendly to the German Reich? Czechoslovakia might perhaps be still existing had not this policy of hostility to Germany prevailed, which made it in the words of the French Air Minister Pierre Cot into an aircraft carrier directed against Germany. As long as Czechoslovakia was hostile to us so long was the security of Germany uncertain.

After Munich the development in Czechoslovakia had been closely observed on the German side. The Führer had given repeated warnings. The new Czech President had shown himself to be too weak. A military clique embittered by the Munich agreement had called for revenge and the hostility to Germany had been greater than before Munich. No reduction had been made in the army, which represented a considerable threat to Germany, and the economic life of Czechoslovakia had not been adjusted to the German economic life, as would have been necessary for satisfactory collaboration. For the security of the German nation it was necessary that the situation be made entirely clear. Thus the Protectorate had been brought about. This Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia would in its internal administration and in its culture remain completely independent and would even be permitted to maintain a small army. Of course this could only be in peacetime, as during the war special regulations would prevail.

When France and England lost this important outpost they were greatly exercised. That was thoroughly understandable from their policy of hostility toward Germany. But it was also understandable that Germany had taken possession of this enemy bastion in the middle of her territory.

Passing to the subject of Poland, the Field Marshal declared that here also Germany had done everything possible to come to a good understanding with that country. Just as Herr von Ribbentrop had been commissioned to undertake the *rapprochement* with England, so the Field Marshal himself had been ordered to undertake *rapprochement* with Poland. He had maintained the best relationships with numerous Polish personalities, with Pilsudski, Beck, and others who had been his personal guests. On the German side there had been no objections to the existence of Poland, but on the contrary, the interest of Germany in maintaining a strong Poland was empha-

sized. The Poles had also acknowledged that Danzig was German, just as Germany acknowledged that Poland had economic interests in Danzig. Therefore, we had believed that the Danzig question could be solved best by the return of Danzig to Germany, with Poland's economic interests therein not only being preserved, but with even a free port area there being granted to Poland. Additionally there should have been created also a sort of small corridor consisting of an automobile highway and a four-tracked railway across the Polish Corridor to insure connections with East Prussia. In order to obtain such an agreement, the Führer was ready to give up finally all claim to a great German province in which many Germans lived, to guarantee the boundary with Poland, and to conclude a twenty-five year non-aggression treaty. From his personal knowledge of Beck and Moscicki, at least these two statesmen were willing to concede these German demands, yet the Poles in their entire history almost always had come to disaster through self-deception and their overvaluation of prestige.

At this moment England had stepped in. On the day after the Munich accord, when the declaration between the Führer and Mr. Chamberlain had been signed, according to which war should never again rise between Germany and England, people in Germany had been very happy. A long-felt desire of the Führer appeared now to have been fulfilled. Therefore, in Germany people were astounded when a short time thereafter Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Eden, Mr. Duff Cooper, and others proclaimed Munich as a disaster for England and declared that England must now arm herself thoroughly so that never again could another Munich occur. This had in a way represented the first concealed declaration of war on the part of England against Germany. Also the Führer had seen at this moment that only under pressure had the English declared themselves ready to come to an understanding at Munich.

Then England came out with the Polish guaranty, of which at first Beck had no knowledge and to the acceptance of which he was more or less forced. As a result the Polish attitude stiffened, they became daily more extreme and insulting in their statements and finally went as far as the murder and torture of members of the German minority. We had photographic records of the outrages committed by Polish bands. The cruelty

evidenced in these documents seemed to him (the Field Marshal) to put even the Middle Ages in the shade. This the German nation could not allow. In such a situation, which deeply affected the national honor, no compromise was possible. Action must be taken against Poland. It must, however, be stated that from the German side assurances were given to England that this was the sole problem remaining to be solved and that then, with England and France, the settlement in common of European problems could be undertaken. Besides the official negotiations, the confidential representatives of the Field Marshal were active in this effort up to the last hour before the outbreak of war, pointing out the folly of a European conflict in the face of this attitude on the part of Germany.

There followed the declaration of war by the Western Powers, a one-sided declaration. Germany herself had never declared war. In this connection it should also be noted that the French Foreign Minister had clearly given the German Foreign Minister to understand, on the occasion of the latter's visit to Paris in 1938, that France was no longer interested in eastern questions. France would of her own accord surely not have entered the war, but England would not let escape this opportunity to destroy Germany.

A further sure proof that England was the real inciter of the war appears in the fact that Mussolini's compromise suggestion, which he despatched at the last moment to the powers involved, was accepted by Germany and France. Only England said "No", and eventually compelled France to change her position. These were actual facts, an account the truth of which M. Daladier would even now have to acknowledge.

After the Polish war had been completed in 18 days, the Führer had still made a final peace offer. Germany wanted not a single French village or piece of English territory. Germany offered peace when German claims had been met, and the Führer declared himself prepared even yet to go through with all the earlier plans for collaboration. In Germany it was hoped that England would clearly recognize how advantageous that sort of an arrangement, which envisaged the collaboration of the four European great powers, would be. Instead, the German peace offer was rejected scornfully and the greatest mistake made which could be made; the offer was ascribed to weakness. That was absolute foolishness. Whoever knows the



Führer, knows that his patience and indulgence are often very great. However, when the limit is reached, the Führer is seized with an iron determination and nothing can then swerve him from his goal. He saw the purpose of England to bring Germany back to the situation of Versailles, in other words, to destroy her. In spite of the limited extent of the formal proposals which might be proposed on the part of the English, all Germans were convinced of the English intention to annihilate them. The case was therefore clear. Germany wished peace, but before she would allow herself to be destroyed by her opponents she would fight, even though the war might last for 30 years.

Sir John Simon's speech of the previous day, and he recommended a careful reading of it to Mr. Sumner Welles, was a complete confirmation of what he had said. It was pitiless, presumptuous, and impudent. Whether the war must go on depended not on Germany, but on her opponents. To ward off destruction Germany would fight to the last man.

Since, however, on the part of Germany, these intentions on the part of her opponents to destroy her had been known for a considerable period, Germany had made preparations in good time to defend herself, both materially and psychologically. The morale of the troops was outstanding. They were aroused by the desire to break the destructive force of their opponents who held them in disesteem, and were convinced that this could only be brought about by a German victory. Before God and the whole world he could affirm that Germany had not sought the war. It was forced on her, and the Field Marshal had himself up to the last moment done everything possible to avert it. What could Germany do, when the others wanted to destroy her? "Hitlerism must be destroyed" was their watchword and since Hitler was identical with Germany, that meant the destruction of the Reich.

The English believed that they could readily attain their goal through the blockade. At that the Field Marshal could only wish them "Much success". He was primarily a soldier, but for the past 3½ years he had also been busied with economic questions. The lack of raw materials from which Germany suffered, had been countered by the substitution of other materials or the provision of large stockpiles. Also the blockade had many gaps. These preparations had been charged

against Germany as though they were a matter for reproach. But the factories which had to be constructed for the Four-Year Plan, which would perhaps have been unnecessary in a situation of normal economic relationships on the part of all countries, were no more than living witnesses to the ununderstanding attitude of the world in economic matters.

Germany had, however, two important raw materials: iron and coal. In Germany many items could be made from coal, even butter. Also Germany had an unassailable agricultural economy. She had entered the war with a supply of 7½ million tons of grain as a reserve. Added to that would be her own production and imports from southeastern Europe. In no case would starvation appear, for the bread ration was assured. Many schools and auditoriums had been filled with grain in storage and the supplies on hand were equitably rationed.

Although Germany suffered from a shortage of fats, the average German got more butter than was available by rationing in wealthy England. The soldiers and heavy workers got three times the amount. England had always declared it would be a long war. This Germany knew and was prepared for it. Whether the war was short or long there would certainly be no revolution in the rear of the fighting forces.

Summing up, the Field Marshal declared that it was a great tragedy that the sword was forced into the hand of the Führer for a battle with that nation with whom he had done his utmost for *rapprochement* and with whom an agreement had always been considered his greatest aim. Fate—or England—had willed it otherwise, since for an agreement two were necessary. Now an out-and-out blow must be dealt against England's efforts at hegemony. Even now, though, Germany did not desire to destroy either England or her Empire. England must only be shown that she no longer held supremacy. Germany understood and recognized the world-wide interests of the British Empire, but she would not endure a state of tutelage.

Mr. Sumner Welles replied that he was deeply impressed by the Field Marshal's extraordinarily clear exposition. If the German Government had the absolute conviction that war was the only possible way of attaining the security which the German people required, then there was nothing for him to say, except that he would state that he



had taken full and complete account of the Field Marshal's views. If, however, on the German side, it was considered that there was any possibility of reaching by methods of negotiation an enduring peace and any sort of guaranty of security, then he might still be able to report to President Roosevelt with a measure of hopefulness.

Sumner Welles declared that he thoroughly understood the desire of the German people for security and also saw that such a proud race as the Germans, if their opponents' desire for their annihilation was absolutely certain, would resist with all their strength. Also he had remarked in other connections that an enduring peace could only be built on firm foundations if the German people were united, contented and happy, and convinced that they had the same opportunities as the people of other countries. That was certainly a prerequisite for any lasting peace.

He would, speaking with the same frankness as the Field Marshal, mention certain difficulties which the world outside Germany had in judging Germany's declarations of her intentions. Repeatedly from responsible German quarters there had come statements that certain steps, undertaken for the unification of the German people or for other purposes, were the last and that no further territorial claims remained.

The Führer at Munich had spoken of questions affecting the vital interests of the Reich. From the statements of the Field Marshal it had become somewhat clearer to Mr. Welles what was meant thereby. He would like, however, to ask the Field Marshal to outline these requirements of life and death importance still more definitely.

Field Marshal Goering answered with renewed emphasis on the impossibility of arriving at a peace by negotiation, that if their opponents did not recede from their aims of annihilation, peace could only be attained in the present circumstances by force of arms resulting in victory. This view had been again confirmed by Simon's speech of the previous day. The requirements of Germany affecting her vital interests were as follows: (1) Absolute security of the German people united into the great Reich, so that they would not be forced into a new war every 20 or 30 years; (2) Adequate possibilities of supplying the German economy; (3) Return of the German colonies (not for military purposes) and; (4) Recognition of Germany as a member of the international community with full rights.

In the further course of the interview the Field Marshal added some personal words about German-American relations. He had always conferred with prominent Germans who were traveling to America and told them that in their relations with leading Americans they should always emphasize that Germany had nothing against America and had only the desire to advance trade with her. If in the United States objection was raised to several German methods, it should be noted that these methods were suited only to ourselves and that often things which seemed severe had to be so in order to have their effect. If Germany proceeded against the Jews on racial grounds, he might also refer to experience with racial questions in America, as a result of which the colored people were not permitted to ride in the same vehicles as the whites.

Sumner Welles interjected that this applied to only a small part of America and that on the other hand there was even a colored Representative in Congress.

Field Marshal Goering stated further that in America people had described the Germans as anti-Christian. But everywhere in Germany churches were open and divine services held. Attacks had only been made on a certain political party which wanted to make a business out of religion, but not on religion as such.

Sumner Welles replied that he was very glad that the matter of German-American relations had been brought up by the Field Marshal. For many generations America had maintained with no one closer, more friendly, and more agreeable relations than with Germany. He wanted to state in all frankness that the question of the treatment of minorities was a matter of great concern to all Americans. The Americans were an idealistic people with a deep humanitarian strain. Bad treatment of human beings, whether it involved mistreatment of negroes by the English [*Miss-handlung von Schwarzen durch die Engländer*] or the things which were taking place in Germany, touched the humanitarian feelings of the Americans most deeply.

A further cause of unsatisfactory relations between America and Germany lay in the firm belief on the part of the Americans that international differences of opinion could be settled by peaceful means. In the last few years the use of force had increased, not only by Germany, but in other parts of the world, so that finally only the American

hemisphere remained free of war. This situation of increasing use of force affected every American's feeling of security about his own country directly and personally. For this reason the mission of Under Secretary Welles was being followed in America with unusual interest and people hoped, although hope had almost disappeared, that a peaceful solution would yet be found. America knew that she did not live any longer far removed from Europe, and she saw that her vital interests were closely affected by what went on in Europe. If, in any way, in view of what the Field Marshal had said, the German Government could participate in a last effort at laying the foundations of a durable peace, then certainly close friendly relations between America and Germany could also be reestablished.

Sumner Welles added that, if the foundations of security and of a just peace could be laid, and he had always held that this must be attained with due attention to German requirements, America was ready to take part in every effort which would then be needed to find practical ways and means leading to reduction of armaments and restoration of freer world trade. It was well known to the Field Marshal that America had already entered into negotiations with the neutral states to establish whether an agreement might be reached on certain fundamentals for promotion of world trade. He hoped that the German Government would also perhaps agree on these fundamentals. Of course they could not be observed during the war, but they were to be recognized as an end to be achieved after the conclusion of peace. He again stated in this connection that without sound world trade no enduring peace could be attained, and he presented a Memorandum in which briefly and in general terms these fundamentals, namely, non-discrimination, most-favored-nation treatment, etc., were set forth.

The Field Marshal, after expressing agreement with these fundamentals and again emphasizing that Germany would gladly return to an economic system with no restrictions, which had only been adopted by force of circumstances, on the subject of non-discrimination, referred to the prejudicial treatment which German imports encountered in the United States.

Sumner Welles expressed himself as well pleased over the Field Marshal's attitude toward the American economic proposals and declared that discrim-

ination against German goods in America was connected with a general policy of autarchy in American tariff legislation. He asked whether the Field Marshal or other leading German personality might possibly in a public statement express agreement with the fundamentals set forth in the American Memorandum and was most pleased when the Field Marshal agreed that this would be done.

Sumner Welles declared, in conclusion, that he left the Field Marshal with the hope that a way could still be found to avoid the tragedy of a war of annihilation. He stated that he would again visit the Duce and that about March 26 he would report to President Roosevelt on his impressions received in Europe. He would welcome it if these impressions were of such a sort as to leave still some hope of peace.

Sumner Welles stated that during his European trip or after his return to America he might wish to send certain information to the Field Marshal, and he proposed such information should be forwarded through Mr. Kirk. To this the Field Marshal agreed.

In conclusion the Field Marshal declared that he was glad that Mr. Sumner Welles, as a neutral, calm, and clear-thinking observer, had come to Germany, in order to see the situation as it actually was. The Field Marshal placed great value on such direct contacts of leading personalities. Sumner Welles had seen that the war aim of Germany was peace. If, as he regretfully could not believe, the will to annihilation on the part of Germany's enemies should be given up, peace could be made quickly. But Sumner Welles would have a difficult time on this matter with Germany's enemies. In any case he had undertaken a task which was one of the greatest and noblest which could be given a man, and if his mission were a success, that would be a wonderful reward for all his efforts.

Mr. Sumner Welles thanked the Field Marshal for his words and declared that he was deeply impressed by what he had learned in their conference. A man-to-man and heart-to-heart conversation of this sort was much more liable to remove the difficulties than the efforts of the all too numerous fourth- or fifth-rate personalities, who in the past had undertaken this without success.

After a tour of Karin Hall the conference came to an end, having lasted almost three hours.

BERLIN, 4 March 1940

SCHMIDT

# Composition of Organs, Commissions, and Committees of the United Nations

*Notes prepared by DENYS P. MYERS*

THE work of the United Nations proceeds through the principal organs established by article 7 of the Charter. The structure of each organ is further set forth in separate chapters of the Charter, supplemented in the case of the International Court of Justice by the Statute and in all cases by rules of procedure, appropriate reports, and resolutions, and eventually by formal agreements in certain cases. In the subjoined list the basis for the constitution of the entities noticed is given.

The composition of each body is of fundamental importance. According to the nature of the work assigned, they may be composed of personnel falling into several categories:

1. Member states represented, permanently or temporarily, by particular agents of their governments;

2. Officials of governments (a) designated by their own governments or (b) appointed in virtue of their national official and/or expert qualifications;

3. Persons of expert qualifications appointed or elected for their expert capacity.

In setting up the lists of members of the bodies these categories have been indicated by variations as follows:

1. Names of states with names of incumbents in parentheses;

- 2 (a) Names of persons with names of states in parentheses;

- 2 (b) and 3. Names of persons identified by nationality adjectives.

## I. General Assembly

Charter, chapter IV, articles 9-22; Provisional Rules of Procedure.

In being only during a session.

First Session: First Part, London, January 10-February 14, 1946; Second Part, New York, September 3- , 1946.

Delegations (5 representatives) of each Member of the United Nations; 5 alternate representatives, advisers, technical advisers and experts.

## A. PROCEDURAL COMMITTEES

### 1. General Committee

Provisional Rules of Procedure, rules 32-35.

Delegates of 14 Members, presided over by President of the General Assembly; comprising the seven Vice Presidents and the Chairmen of the six Main Committees.

### 2. Credentials Committee

Provisional Rules of Procedure, rules 23-24.

Nine Delegates of Members elected and appointed by each session on the proposal of the President.

## B. MAIN COMMITTEES

Provisional Rules of Procedure, rules 91-103.

One Delegate of each Member.

The six Main Committees (organized at each session) are:

1. *Political and Security Committee* (including the regulation of armaments);

2. *Economic and Financial Committee*;

3. *Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee*;

4. *Trusteeship Committee*;

5. *Administrative and Budgetary Committee*;

6. *Legal Committee*.

Mr. Myers is an officer in the Division of International Organization Affairs, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State.



## C. STANDING COMMITTEES

1. *Advisory Committee for Administrative and Budgetary Questions*

Provisional Rules of Procedure, rules 37-39, and rule J.

Nine persons of different nationality, to be elected at the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly for terms corresponding to three financial years, serving by annual rotation.

2. *Committee on Contributions*

Provisional Rules of Procedure, rules 40-42.

Ten experts of different nationality elected February 13, 1946 by the General Assembly for staggered terms.

## One-Year Term

Paul H. Appleby (American)  
Chia Chao-ting (Chinese)  
Pavle Lukin (Yugoslav)

## Two-Year Term

M. Baumont (French)  
Sir Cecil Kisch (British)  
Nedim el-Pachachi (Iraqi)

## Three-Year Term

J. P. Bridgen (Australian)  
Seymour Jacklin (South African)  
Gustavo Martinez Cabañas (Mexican)  
Nicolai V. Orlov (Soviet)

## D. SPECIFICALLY CONSTITUTED

1. *Commission on Atomic Energy*

Set up by resolution of the General Assembly adopted January 24, 1946; Rules of Procedure to be approved by the Security Council.

Meeting, New York, 1946.

The commission is to make specific proposals under its terms of reference and submit its reports to the Security Council, which in appropriate cases will transmit them to the General Assembly and the Members of the United Nations.

Consists of one representative of each Member of the United Nations represented on the Security Council, and of Canada. Appointments of the regular representatives have not yet been made.

Australia  
Brazil  
Canada  
China  
Egypt  
France  
Mexico  
Netherlands  
Poland

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
United Kingdom (Sir Alexander Cadogan; alternate, Sir James Chadwick)  
United States (Bernard M. Baruch)

2. *Committee on UNRRA*

Established by resolution of the General Assembly adopted February 1, 1946.

Meeting, London, February 14, 1946; Atlantic City, March 25- 1946.

Consists of representatives of 11 Members of the United Nations named in the resolution.

|                    |                                     |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Canada             | Norway                              |
| China              | Poland                              |
| Dominican Republic | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| France             | United Kingdom                      |
| Greece             | United States                       |
| New Zealand        |                                     |

3. *Headquarters Commission*

Established by resolution of the General Assembly adopted February 14, 1946.

Consists of representatives of 9 Members of the United Nations named in the resolution.

|             |                                     |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|
| Australia   | United Kingdom                      |
| China       | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| France      | Uruguay                             |
| Iraq        | Yugoslavia                          |
| Netherlands |                                     |

## 3-a. Planning Commission of Experts

Appointment to be considered at Second Part of First Session according to resolution of the General Assembly adopted February 14, 1946.

## I-A. Officers of First Part of First Session of General Assembly

President: Paul Henri Spaak (Belgium)  
Vice Presidents: Chief Delegates (or alternates) of—

|   |
|---|
| China (Wang Shih-chieh)                 |
| France (Georges Bidault)                |
| Union of South Africa (Heaton Nicholls) |



Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
(Andrei Y. Vyshinsky)  
United Kingdom (Clement R. Attlee)  
United States (James F. Byrnes)  
Venezuela (Roberto Picon Lares)

#### A. PROCEDURAL COMMITTEES

##### 1. General Committee

The President

The seven Vice Presidents

The Chairman of the six main Committees:

Dmitry Z. Manuilsky (Ukrainian  
S.S.R.)  
Waclaw Konderski (Poland)  
Peter Fraser (New Zealand)  
Roberto E. MacEachen (Uruguay)  
Faris al-Khouri (Syria)  
Roberto Jiménez (Panama)

##### 2. Credentials Committee

Denmark (Gustav Rasmussen), Chair-  
man  
Byelorussian S. S. R. (Kuzma V.  
Kiselev)  
China (Foo Ping-sheung)  
France (Jean de la Grandville)  
Haiti (Léon Laleau)  
Paraguay (Andrés Aguilera)  
Philippine Commonwealth (Pedro  
López)  
Saudi Arabia (Sayed Jamil Daoud)  
Turkey (Sevket Fuad Kececi)

#### B. MAIN COMMITTEES

Officers listed; each Member assigned a Delegate.

##### 1. Political and Security Committee

Chairman, Dmitry Z. Manuilsky (Ukrainian  
S. S. R.); vice chairman, Joseph Bech (Luxem-  
bourg); rapporteur, Homero Viteri Lafronte  
(Ecuador).

##### 2. Economic and Financial Committee

Chairman, Waclaw Konderski (Poland); vice  
chairman, Pedro López (Philippines); rap-  
porteur, Eduardo del Portillo (Bolivia).

##### 3. Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Com- mittee

Chairman, Peter Fraser (New Zealand); vice  
chairman, Fernando Soto Harrison (Costa Rica);  
rapporteur, Frieda Dalen (Norway).

##### 4. Trusteeship Committee

Chairman, Roberto E. MacEachen (Uruguay);  
vice chairman, Blatta Ephrem Tewelde Medhen  
(Ethiopia); rapporteur, Ivan Kerno (Czecho-  
slovakia).

##### 5. Administrative and Budgetary Committee

Chairman, Faris al-Khouri (Syria); vice chair-  
man, Ales Bebler (Yugoslavia); rapporteur,  
Thanassis Agnides (Greece).

##### 6. Legal Committee

Chairman, Roberto Jiménez (Panama); vice  
chairman, Per Federspiel (Denmark); rapporteur,  
John Erskine Read (Canada).

#### C. STANDING COMMITTEES

The Committee on Contributions (C (2)) was  
established February 13, 1946.

#### D. Ad hoc COMMITTEES

##### 1. Permanent Headquarters Committee

Chairman, Eduardo Zuleta Angel (Colombia);  
vice chairman, L. Dana Wilgress (Canada); rap-  
porteur, Nasrollah Entezam (Iran).

##### 2. League of Nations Committee

Chairman, Erik Andreas Colban (Norway);  
vice chairman, Sheik Hafiz Wahba (Saudi  
Arabia); rapporteur, H. T. Andrews (South  
Africa).

## II. Security Council

Charter, chapter V, articles 23-32; Provisional Rules of  
Procedure.

Organized so as to be able to function contin-  
uously.

In session, London, January 17-February 16,  
1946; New York, March 25- , 1946.

Eleven Members, five—China, France, the Union  
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom,  
and the United States—of which are permanent,  
and six of which are elected by the General Assem-  
bly for a normal term of two years. Election on  
January 12, 1946 allocated three Members to a one-  
year term and three to a two-year term.

Representatives present at the first and certain  
other meetings:

#### MEMBERS

##### Permanent Members

China (V. K. Wellington Koo; Quo Tai-chi<sup>1</sup>)

<sup>1</sup> Designated by the Member as the permanent incumbent.

France (Vincent Auriol; Georges Bidault)  
 Soviet Union (Andrei Y. Vyshinsky; Andrei A. Gromyko)  
 United Kingdom (Ernest Bevin; Sir Alexander Cadogan<sup>1</sup>)  
 United States (Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.<sup>2</sup>)

#### One-Year Term

Egypt (Abdel Hamid Badawi Pasha; Mamdouh Riaz)  
 Mexico (Alfonso de Rosenzweig Díaz; Luis Padilla Nervo, Gustavo Martínez Cabañas)  
 Netherlands (Eelco N. van Kleffens<sup>1</sup>)

#### Two-Year Term

Australia (Norman John Oswald Makin)  
 Brazil (Cyro de Freitas Valle; Pedro Leão Veloso Netto<sup>1</sup>)  
 Poland (Zygmunt Modzelewski)

#### *Ad hoc* PARTICIPANTS AT CERTAIN MEETINGS

According to article 31 of the Charter, any Member which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of questions which the Security Council finds specially affect the interests of that Member.

The following participated in London meetings:

Greece (Thanassis Aghnides)  
 Lebanon (Hamid Bey Frangié)  
 Syria (Faris al-Khoury)  
 Ukrainian S. S. R. (Dmitry Z. Manuisky)

#### ROTATION OF PRESIDENCY

The presidency of the Security Council rotates monthly in the English alphabetical order of the names of Members.

- |              |  |
|--------------|--|
| 1. Australia | 7. Netherlands                         |
| 2. Brazil    | 8. Poland                              |
| 3. China     | 9. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| 4. Egypt     | 10. United Kingdom                     |
| 5. France    | 11. United States                      |
| 6. Mexico    |  |

<sup>1</sup> Designated by the Member as the permanent incumbent.

<sup>2</sup> Appointed, in virtue of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (Public Law 264, 79th Cong., 1st sess.), by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate as the "representative of the United States at the seat of the United Nations" with the rank and status of envoy extraordinary and ambassador plenipotentiary. He represents the United States in the Security Council and performs such other functions in connection with the participation of the United States in the United Nations as the President may from time to time direct.

#### COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON RULES OF PROCEDURE

Informally constituted at first meeting of the Council on January 17, 1946.

Consists of one representative of each Member of the United Nations represented on the Security Council.

#### II-A. Military Staff Committee

Charter, article 47; Provisional Rules of Procedure.

Organized so as to be able to function at all times in accordance with directives of the Security Council and with approved plans.

In session, London, February 4-14, 1946; New York, March 25- , 1946.

Consists of the Chiefs of Staff of China, France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States, or their representatives (one officer each from the land, sea, and air forces) who sit as members in the absence of their Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of Members of the United Nations who participate in a meeting to which they are specifically invited are not considered as members of the Military Staff Committee. Subcommittees have the same composition.

The chairmanship rotates on a monthly basis among the five national delegations in the English alphabetical order of the names of the countries.

Attendance at first meeting:

*Chinese* (Chiefs of Staff, General Shang Chen):

Lt. Gen. Kwei Yun-chin  
 Capt. Chow Ying-tsung  
 Col. Huang Pun-young

*French* (Chiefs of Staff, titular):

Colonel d'Esneval  
 Vice Admiral R. Fénard  
 Lt. Col. P. Stehlin

*Soviet* (Chiefs of Staff, titular):

Lt. Gen. Aleksandr F. Vasiliev  
 Vice Admiral Valentin L. Bogdenko  
 Maj. Gen. Andrei R. Sharapov

*British* (Chiefs of Staff, titular):

Lt. Gen. Sir Edwin L. Morris  
 Admiral Sir Henry Moore  
 Air Chief Sir Guy Garrod

*American* (Chiefs of Staff, titular):

Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway  
 Admiral Richmond K. Turner  
 General George C. Kenney

### III. Economic and Social Council

Charter, chapter X, articles 61-72; Rules of Procedure, adopted by the Council February 16, 1946.

Holds at least three sessions each year.

First session, London, January 23-February 18, 1946; second session, New York, May 25- , 1946.

Consists of 18 Members elected by the General Assembly, each having one representative on the Council. Members are elected for terms of 3 years, the first Council being allocated by groups of six to 1-, 2- and 3-year terms.

The President and Vice Presidents hold office until their successors are elected at the first meeting following the next regular session of the General Assembly, that is, when the Council is organized with a newly elected group of six Members.

In the following list the representatives designated by Members at the first meeting of the first session are given.

#### MEMBERS

##### One-Year Term

Colombia (Carlos Lleras Restrepo), Vice President  
Greece (Kyriakos Varvaressos)  
Lebanon (Yussef Bey Salem)  
Ukrainian S. S. R. (Vasily A. Tarasenko)  
United States (John G. Winant<sup>3</sup>)  
Yugoslavia (Dr. Andrija Stampar), Vice President

##### Two-Year Term

Cuba (Ramiro Guerra)  
Czechoslovakia (Jan Masaryk)  
India (Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar), President  
Norway (Finn Moe)  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Vasily A. Sergeev)  
United Kingdom (Philip J. Noel-Baker)

##### Three-Year Term

Belgium (Fernand Dehousse)  
Canada (Paul Martin)  
Chile (Germán Vergara)  
China (P. C. Chang)  
France (Joseph Paul-Boncour)  
Peru (Alberto Arca Parró)

#### A. COMMITTEES OF THE COUNCIL

##### 1. *Negotiating Committee on Specialized Agencies*

Constituted February 18, 1946 under resolution of the Council adopted February 11, 1946 to define the terms on which specialized agencies shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with articles 57 and 63 of the Charter.

First meeting, London, February 19, 1946; next session, New York, May 24- , 1946.

Consists of 12 members of the Council, including the President.

|   |                                     |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| President of the Council (Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar) | Czechoslovakia                      |
| Belgium   | France                              |
| Canada  | Norway                              |
| Chile   | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| China   | United Kingdom                      |
| Colombia  | United States                       |

##### 2. *Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations*

Constituted February 18, 1946 by decision of the Council taken February 7, 1946 to consider applications of certain non-governmental organizations for consultative status and to study the general question of defining the "suitable arrangements" to be made in fulfillment of article 71 of the Charter.

First meeting, London, February 20, 1946; next session, New York, May 20- , 1946.

Consists of 12 members of the Council, including the President.

|   |                                     |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| President of the Council (Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar) | Peru                                |
| China   | Ukrainian S. S. R.                  |
| Cuba  | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| France  | United Kingdom                      |
| Greece  | United States                       |
| Lebanon   | Yugoslavia                          |

<sup>3</sup> Sec. 2 (d) of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (Public Law 264, 79th Cong., 1st sess.) stipulates that the representative of the United States in the Economic and Social Council shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Any officer of the United States, however, may be designated to act without compensation in the absence of the regular representative or in lieu of the regular representative for a specified subject at a specified meeting. The regular representative is not yet appointed.

## B. COORDINATION COMMISSION

To be constituted at second session of the Council to carry out the duties described in the report of the Preparatory Commission, Chapter III, section V, paragraphs 12-14.

### C. COMMITTEES SET UP BY THE COUNCIL

#### 1. *Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Trade and Employment.*

Constituted February 18, 1946 as a result of proposal put on the agenda of the Council and reported as a resolution adopted February 18, 1946.

First session, London, April 8- , 1946.

Consists of representatives of 17 governments and one customs union.

|                    |                                     |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Australia          | Lebanon                             |
| Belgium-Luxembourg | Netherlands                         |
| Brazil             | New Zealand                         |
| Canada             | Norway                              |
| Chile              | South Africa                        |
| China              | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| Cuba               | United Kingdom                      |
| Czechoslovakia     | United States                       |
| France             |                                     |
| India              |                                     |

#### 2. *Special Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons*

Constituted February 18, 1946 by the Council as a result of proposal put on the agenda of the General Assembly and adopted by it February 12, 1946.

First session, London, April 8- , 1946.

Consists of representatives of 20 Members.

|                       |                                     |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Australia             | Netherlands                         |
| Belgium               | New Zealand                         |
| Brazil                | Peru                                |
| Byelorussian S. S. R. | Poland                              |
| Canada                | Ukrainian S. S. R.                  |
| China                 | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| Colombia              | United Kingdom                      |
| Czechoslovakia        | United States                       |
| Dominican Republic    | Yugoslavia                          |
| France                |                                     |
| Lebanon               |                                     |

#### 3. *Technical Preparatory Committee for Health Conference*

Constituted by Economic and Social Council, February 18, 1946.

Session at Paris, March 18- , 1946.

Consists of 16 technical representatives of governments—

Dr. Gregorio Bermann (Argentina)  
 Dr. René Sand (Belgium)  
 Dr. Gerald H. de Paula Souza (Brazil)  
 Maj. Gen. G. B. Chisholm (Canada)  
 Dr. P. Z. King; alternate Sze-ming Sze (China)  
 Dr. Josef Cancik (Czechoslovakia)  
 Dr. Aly Tewfik Shousha Pasha (Egypt)  
 Dr. A. Cavaillon; alternate Dr. Xavier Leclainche (France)  
 Dr. Kopanaris (Greece)  
 Major C. Mani; alternate Dr. Chuni Lal Katial (India)  
 Dr. Manuel Martínez Baez (Mexico)  
 Dr. Karl Evang (Norway)  
 Dr. Martin Kacprzak (Poland)  
 Sir Wilson Jameson; alternate Dr. Melville MacKenzie (United Kingdom)  
 Dr. Thomas S. Parran; alternate Dr. James A. Doull (United States)  
 Dr. Andrija Stampar (Yugoslavia)

In a consultative capacity representatives of—

Pan American Sanitary Bureau  
 L'Office International d'Hygiène Publique  
 League of Nations Health Organization  
 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

### III-A. Commissions Set up by the Council

Charter, article 68.

First meetings, New York, April 29- , 1946.

The Preparatory Commission in its Report recommended that the Economic and Social Council establish certain commissions and formulated statements concerning their functions in Chapter III, Sec. 1-A, paragraphs 4 and 5, and Sec. 4, paragraphs 14-35.

The Economic and Social Council followed the recommendations at its first session for the most part, but was not sure enough of their ultimate scope to determine the final composition of the commissions. It accordingly on February 18, 1946 appointed "nuclear" commissions consisting of qualified persons named for each commission by the members of the Council itself, the appointees to sit until March 31, 1947.



## A. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Appointments as of February 18, 1946.

Consists of 9 persons.

Paal Berg (Norwegian)  
René Cassin (French)  
Fernand Dehousse (Belgian)  
K. C. Neogi (Indian)  
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt (American)  
Victor Paul Haya de la Torre (Peruvian)  
John C. H. Wu (Chinese)

----- The members of the Council representing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia are entitled to send names to the Secretary-General by March 31, 1946.

*Subcommission on Women*

Appointments as of February 18, 1946.

Consists of 12 persons.

Mrs. Bodil Begtrup (Danish)  
Miss Minerva Bernardino (Dominican)  
Miss Angela Jurdak (Lebanese)  
Rani (Lady) Arut Kaur (Indian)  
Señoreita Gabriela Mistral, i.e. Lucila Godoy de Alcayaga (Chilean)  
Mrs. Pierre Viénot (French)  
Miss Wu Yi-fang (Chinese)

----- The members of the Council representing Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are entitled to send names to the Secretary-General by March 31, 1946.

----- Three members of the Commission on Human Rights, *ex officio*, to be named by March 31, 1946.

## B. ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION

Appointments as of February 18, 1946.

Consists of 9 persons.

Luis Angel Arango (Colombian)  
Franklin L. Ho (Chinese)  
Alexander Kunosi (Czech)  
Fernand van Langenhove (Belgian)  
Alexander Loveday (British)  
Isador Lubin (American)  
Miss R. Zafiriou (Greek)

----- The members of the Council representing Canada and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are entitled to send names to the Secretary-General by March 31, 1946.

## C. TEMPORARY SOCIAL COMMISSION

Appointments as of February 18, 1946.

Consists of 9 persons.

Sidney W. Harris (British)  
Henri Pierre Louis Léopold Hauck (French)  
Frantisek Kraus (Czech)  
Gerardo Molina (Colombian)  
Manuel Seoane (Peruvian)  
Xenophon Zolotas (Greek)

----- The members of the Council representing Yugoslavia, Cuba, and Ukrainian S. S. R. are entitled to send names to the Secretary-General by March 31, 1946.

## D. STATISTICAL COMMISSION

Appointments as of February 18, 1946.

Consists of 9 persons.

H. Campion (British)  
G. Jahn (Norwegian)  
Mr. Mahalanobis (Indian)  
Stuart W. Rice (American)  
Professor Sauvy (French)  
Senhor Teixeira Freitas (Brazil)

----- The members of the Council representing China, Ukrainian S. S. R., and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are entitled to send names to the Secretary-General by March 31, 1946.

## E. COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS

Constituted February 18, 1946.

Consists of representatives of 15 Members of the United Nations which are important producing or manufacturing countries or countries in which illicit traffic in drugs is a serious problem. Representatives, who have not been designated, serve for terms of three years.

|             |                                     |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|
| Canada      | Peru                                |
| China       | Poland                              |
| Egypt       | Turkey                              |
| France      | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| India       | United Kingdom                      |
| Iran        | United States of America            |
| Mexico      | Yugoslavia                          |
| Netherlands |                                     |

## F. TEMPORARY TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Appointments as of February 18, 1946.

Consists of 9 persons—

George Pierce Baker (American)  
Ing. Baracek-Jaquier (Czech)  
Sir Gurunath Bewoor (Indian)  
M. Felepi (French)  
Leif Hoegh (Norwegian)  
Sir H. Osborne Mance (British)

----- The members of the Council representing Chile, China, and Union of  
----- Soviet Socialist Republics are entitled to send names to the Secretary-General by March 31, 1946.

## G. DEMOGRAPHIC COMMISSION

To be constituted at second session of the Council.

## H. FISCAL COMMISSION

To be constituted at second session of the Council.

## IV. Trusteeship Council

Charter, chapters XII and XIII, articles 75-91.

Not yet constituted.

Composition according to article 86 will be:

A. Members administering trust territories;

B. China, France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, if not represented as administrators of trust territories;

C. "As many other Members elected for 3-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary" to equal the Members of the United Nations included in categories A and B.

## V. International Court of Justice

Charter, chapter XIV, articles 92-96; Statute of the International Court of Justice, chapter I, articles 2-33.

Opening session, The Hague, April 3- , 1946.

Members of the United Nations (and other states if admitted by the General Assembly) are parties to the Statute; only the judges are "members of the Court".

Candidates of specified personal qualifications selected by national groups of each party to the Statute are balloted upon simultaneously by the

General Assembly and Security Council. Concurrent absolute majorities of both organs determine the election of 15 candidates. Balloting at London occurred on February 6, 1946 and the completion of the Court was announced to the General Assembly on February 9. The 15 members of the Court are elected for a normal nine-year term, with a renewal of one third every three years. The allocation of members to terms was in 1946 effected by a drawing of lots by the Secretary-General in the General Assembly on February 9.

## A. MEMBERS OF THE COURT

### Three-Year Term

Abdel Hamid Badawi Pasha (Egyptian)  
Hsu Mo (Chinese)  
John Erskine Read (Canadian)  
Bohdan Winiarski (Pole)  
Milovan Zoričić (Yugoslav)

### Six-Year Term

Isidro Fabela Alfaro (Mexican)  
Green Haywood Hackworth (American)  
Helge Klaestad (Norwegian)  
Sergei Borisovich Krylov (Soviet)  
Charles de Visser (Belgian)

### Nine-Year Term

Alejandro Alvarez (Chilean)  
José Philadelpho de Barros e Azevedo (Brazilian)  
Jules Basdevant (French)  
José Gustavo Guerrero (Salvadoran)  
Sir Arnold Duncan McNair (British)

## B. *Ad hoc* MEMBERS OF THE COURT

Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute provides: "If the Court includes upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of the parties, any other party may choose a person to sit as judge".

## VI. The Secretariat

Charter, chapter XV, articles 97-101; Report of the Fifth Committee on the Secretariat adopted February 12, 1946, which incorporates by reference the description of organization given in Report of the Preparatory Commission, chapter VIII, section 2, paragraphs 22-40, and Provisional Staff Regulations; eventually a convention on privileges and immunities and Staff Regulations.

## A. SECRETARY-GENERAL

Charter, articles 97-100.

Appointed by the General Assembly February 1, 1946 upon the recommendation of the Security Council; installed February 3, 1946.

Trygve Lie (Norwegian)

## B. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

Report of the Fifth Committee adopted by the General Assembly February 12, 1946.

The Secretary-General is authorized to appoint eight Assistant Secretaries-General.

The principal units of the Secretariat are—

- a. Department of Security Council Affairs
- b. Department of Economic Affairs
- c. Department of Social Affairs
- d. Department for Trusteeship and Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories
- e. Department of Public Information
- f. Legal Department
- g. Conference and General Services
- h. Administrative and Financial Services

## C. ASSISTANCE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. *Special Committee to Assist the Secretary-General in Negotiating with the Host State*

Authorized by the General Assembly in adopting Report of the Sixth Committee, February 13, 1946.

Consists of qualified representatives of 10 Members of the United Nations.

|           |                           |
|-----------|---------------------------|
| Australia | France                    |
| Belgium   | Poland                    |
| Bolivia   | Union of Soviet Socialist |
| China     | Republics                 |
| Cuba      | United Kingdom            |
| Egypt     |                           |

2. *Negotiating Committee to Assist the Secretary-General with regard to Transfer of League Assets*

Established by resolution of the General Assembly February 12, 1946.

Consists of 8 representatives of Members of the United Nations.

|              |                           |
|--------------|---------------------------|
| Chile        | Union of Soviet Socialist |
| China        | Republics                 |
| France       | United Kingdom            |
| Poland       | United States             |
| South Africa |                           |

## D. SUPPLEMENTARY BODIES

1. *International Civil Service Commission*

Report of the Fifth Committee adopted by the General Assembly February 12, 1946.

To be established by the Secretary-General after consultation with the heads of the specialized agencies brought into relationship with the United Nations.

2. *Advisory Group of Experts*

Report of the Fifth Committee on Budgetary and Financial Arrangements adopted by the General Assembly February 12, 1946.

Appointment by Secretary-General recommended to perform functions suggested in Report of the Preparatory Commission, Chapter IX, Sec. 2, pars. 23-26, in continuation of a group which served the Executive Committee and Preparatory Commission. It would act only until the appointment by the General Assembly of its Standing Committee, the Advisory Committee for Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

3. *Technical Advisory Committee on Information.*

Consideration of setting up such an expert committee was recommended in the Report of the Fifth Committee adopted by the General Assembly on February 12, 1946.



# International Organizations and Conferences

## Calendar of Meetings

|  |                                   |                                     |
|--|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Council of Foreign Ministers: Meeting of Deputies  | London                            | January 18 (continuing in session)  |
| Far Eastern Commission   | Washington                        | February 26 (continuing in session) |
| North Atlantic Route Service Conference  | Dublin                            | March 4 (continuing in session)     |
| Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry  | Jerusalem                         | Hearings opened on about March 6    |
| International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: Boards of Governors | Wilmington Island, Ga.            | March 8 (continuing in session)     |
| Fourth Session of the UNRRA Council  | Atlantic City                     | March 15 (continuing in session)    |
| Preliminary Meeting of Conference on Health Organization   | Paris                             | March 15 (continuing in session)    |
| West Indian Conference   | St. Thomas, Virgin Islands (U.S.) | February 21-March 12                |
| Ninth International Conference of the International Bureau of Education  | Geneva                            | March 4-March 13                    |
| Third Conference of American States Members of the International Labor Organization                            | Mexico, D. F.                     | April 1                             |
| Fifth Pan American Railway Congress  | Montevideo                        | April 5                             |
| The United Nations: Security Council   | New York                          | March 25                            |
| Security Council—Committee of Experts  | London                            | March 15 (continuing in session)    |
| Military Staff Committee   | New York                          | March 25                            |
| Special Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons  | London                            | April 8                             |
| Economic and Social Council: Second Session  | New York                          | May 25                              |

## Activities and Developments

**Fourth Session of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.** The First Council Session was held at Atlantic City in November and December of 1943, the Second Session at Montreal in September 1944, and the Third Session at London in August 1945.

The composition of the U. S. Delegation is as follows:

### *Council Member*

William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State

### *First Alternate*

C. Tyler Wood, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State

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The dates in the calendar are as of Mar. 17.

### *Second Alternate*

Dallas W. Dort, Adviser on Relief and Rehabilitation, Department of State

### *Advisers to Council Member*

Joseph F. McGurk, United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic

Ellen S. Woodward, Member, Social Security Board

Harold Glasser, Deputy Director, Division of Monetary Research, Department of the Treasury

Lawrence Myers, Assistant to the Secretary of Agriculture

S. S. Shepherd, Assistant Director, Division of Administrative Management, Bureau of the Budget

Albert Viton, Deputy United States Executive Officer for the Combined Food Board

George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State

James A. Stillwell, Adviser on Supplies, Department of State

Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Chief Assistant, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State

Robert G. Hooker, Jr., Assistant Chief, Division of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State

Louis L. Williams, Jr., United States Public Health Service on detail to the Department of State

E. F. Penrose, Special Assistant to the United States Ambassador at London

Chester S. Williams, Assistant Chief, Division of Public Liaison, Department of State

Doris H. Cochrane, Information and Liaison Officer, Division of Public Liaison, Department of State

#### *Adviser and Secretary of the Delegation*

David Persinger, Assistant to Adviser on Relief and Rehabilitation, Department of State

#### *Press Relations Officer*

Porter McKeever, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

#### *Assistant Secretary*

J. Ward Lowe, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

#### *Special Advisers to Council Member (to attend if called)*

John H. Ferguson, Legislative Assistant to the Under Secretary of State

John Carter Vincent, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State

Herbert W. Parisius, Deputy Director, Office of World Trade Policy, Department of Commerce

J. F. McArt, Director of Freight Rates, War Shipping Administration

Edward E. Kunze, Chief, UNRRA Division, Office of Budget and Finance, Department of State

Nathan M. Becker, Assistant Adviser on Relief and Rehabilitation, Department of State

Charles P. Nolan, Assistant Adviser, Shipping Division, Department of State

Fred L. Preu, Assistant to Adviser on Relief and Rehabilitation, Department of State

**The Far Eastern Commission** at its weekly meeting on March 14 approved the appointments of three Vice Chairmen: Mr. Andrei A. Gromyko, U.S.S.R.; Dr. Wei Tao-ming, China; and Lord Halifax, Great Britain.

The order of service of the Vice Chairmen will be decided by the three in consultation with the Chairman.

The Commission approved the following Committees:

**Committee No. 1—Reparations:** Chairman, Sir Frederic Eggleston, Australia; Deputy Chairman, Mr. G. A. P. Weyer, Netherlands.

Reparations of goods and materials; restitution of looted property; and related topics.

**Committee No. 2—Economic and Financial Affairs:** Chairman, Sir George Sansom, United Kingdom; Deputy Chairman, Mr. Kenneth Galbraith, United States.

Extent and character of Japanese industry, commerce and agriculture necessary for a viable economy in Japan; measures necessary to establish such an economy; financial problems; and related topics.

**Committee No. 3—Constitutional and Legal Reform:** Chairman, Sir Girja Bajpai, India; Deputy Chairman, Mr. Herbert Norman, Canada.

The Emperor, Diet, Cabinet, local government, political parties, bill of rights, machinery for drafting a new constitution, electoral system, reform of the police system, and related topics.

**Committee No. 4—Strengthening of Democratic Tendencies:** Chairman, Mr. Nikolai V. Novikov, U.S.S.R.; Deputy Chairman, Dr. T. T. Mar, China.

Establishment of freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, and respect for the fundamental human rights; positive policy for the reorientation of the Japanese; other measures to strengthen democratic tendencies and related topics.

**Committee No. 5—War Criminals:** Chairman, Dr. C. L. Hsia, China; Deputy Chairman, Mr. Melquiades Gamboa, Philippines.

Identification, apprehension, and trial of persons suspected of war crimes.

**Committee No. 6—Aliens in Japan:** Chairman, Mr. Francis Lacoste, France; Deputy Chairman, Mr. F. C. Everson, United Kingdom.

Friendly aliens; neutrals; and enemy nationals other than Japanese.

The Steering Committee met on Friday, March 15. The Far Eastern Commission held its fourth meeting on Wednesday, March 20.

**The Inter-American Conference for Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security**, tentatively scheduled to convene in Rio de Janeiro between March 15 and April 15 of this year was indefinitely postponed by vote of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union on March 13, 1946. It was formally resolved to hold this Conference some time prior to the meeting of the Ninth International Conference of American States, scheduled for December of this year.

## World Fund and Bank Inaugural Meeting

### MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN

#### MEMBERS OF THE SAVANNAH CONFERENCE:

On behalf of the United States, I welcome you to a great southern city, Savannah, Georgia.

I should like to recall to your minds now the words with which the late great President Roosevelt welcomed the delegates to the Bretton Woods conference. He said:

"The spirit in which you carry on these discussions will set a pattern for future friendly consultations among nations in their common interests. Further evidence will be furnished at Bretton Woods that men of different nationalities have learned how to adjust possible differences and how to work together as friends.

"The things that we need to do, must be done—can only be done in concert. This Conference will test our capacity to cooperate in peace as we have

in war. I know that you will all approach your task with a high sense of responsibility to those who have sacrificed so much in their hopes for a better world."

Today we all know of the success which was attained at Bretton Woods. For there was constructed a cornerstone upon the foundation of which a sound economic world can—and must—be erected. Whether such a sound economic world will be realized will depend very largely upon your individual and collective endeavors. For the great institutions provided for at Bretton Woods must now become living, operating organisms. To breathe life into these institutions is your challenging task.

In this task I wish you Godspeed. You must not fail.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

### EXCERPTS FROM ADDRESS BY THE TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN<sup>1</sup>

#### REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE UNITED NATIONS:

I welcome you. I welcome you not only as the representatives of friendly nations but also as my personal friends of the past, of today, and of tomorrow. I welcome you all, for now our task is at hand. Ours is the difficult task of waging peace. War, as you know, is not our business. The prevention of war is our business. Our work requires the application of intelligence and effort, and we must do this job without the benefit of the dramatics that bound us together in the war effort.

The Opening Joint Session was held on Mar. 9, 1946. The President's message was read by Warren Kelchner, Secretary-General of the International Secretariat of the Conference.

<sup>1</sup> Fred M. Vinson, Secretary of the U. S. Treasury and United States Governor of the Fund and the Bank. Mr. Vinson was unanimously elected Chairman of the Board of the Fund and the Bank on Mar. 11, 1946. Representatives of the United Kingdom, China, France, and India hold the office of Vice chairmen.

In greeting you here today, I cannot—and I would not—escape the nostalgic memories of our other meeting, that remarkable conference at Bretton Woods. I know I speak for all of those who had the privilege of participating in the Bretton Woods conference when I say that one of the most outstanding achievements of that conference was never recorded in the documents emerging from that historic assembly. The fact that this major achievement was never inscribed on any of the formal records of that conference does not mean, however, that it was neglected or its true import escaped our attention. For the mutual trust and genuine understanding between the representatives of 45 nations achieved at Bretton Woods springs not from the words of man—but from his heart. So too, on this occasion, the final measure of our success will never be found in the words we speak but in the inarticulate feelings and spirit buried within our hearts.



I repeat again that written words do not convey this full meaning in themselves. I read them and I know what they mean to me. I do not know, I could not know, that they mean precisely the same to you. In fact, if we were so disposed, probably we could sit here in this very room and wage intellectual and academic warfare about nuances in their meaning until the end of time. From the escapist point of view this form of intellectual acrobatics would be easy. We could be certain, in such a case, however, of only one thing. Eventually, perhaps in our own time and while our own wise words echoed against these walls, we would be interrupted. A stray atom bomb, or perhaps something even more violent, would drop among us and our unspoken thoughts would perish in our minds, for we, and our Fund and Bank, would no longer exist. No, gentlemen, ours cannot be the escapist course of the intellectual cloister. Ours must be the practical, concrete course. Ours is a race against time for sanity.

We have the Bretton Woods agreements right here with us. Truly, I feel humble in their presence, because they are great documents. They permeate this room with their honesty, their virtue, and their truth. We sat down together and wrote them, with our hands and our hearts and our minds. Here they are, just as we wrote them. And here in this room are most of the men who wrote them.

When we had finished with our work at Bretton Woods we were somewhat relieved, for we found that we had not signed away our self-respect or the real interests of our respective countries. We rediscovered that national self-interest cannot of itself survive, and that world trade and world reconstruction, on a sound basis, must be the cornerstone of lasting peace. As Lord Keynes said, we had to find a "common rule applicable to each, and not irksome to any". We had anxious moments to be sure. But there was one purpose that bound us together, even when we were continents apart in language and experience. We wanted to succeed. We had enough of the great catastrophe of war, resounding around our heads, sickening and murderous. There was only a shred of human dignity from which to weave our

pattern of world peace and salutary world trade. We knew what it was to be united, and I mean genuinely united, in the heart and in the mind.

We must get on with our peace-building work. Today the weapons are laid aside, only laid aside. They could be picked up again. The eager hands of the soldier now busy themselves in building himself a house, so that he may have dignity again, so that he may have peace and quiet. But the individual's resolve to go the way of peace is only half the answer. The individual and the nation must both resolve to exert their collective powers to insure collective peace. Into the fabric of that collective peace must be woven the strong cords of universal economic and political justice and security. Then, and only then, will my home—and your home—be free from the spectre of the next, and perhaps the last, war.

We have tried to respond to some real part of that responsibility by establishing the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank. They are not the whole answer. We know that. But they are—and I say it humbly, though earnestly—an extremely big part of the answer.

Believing all this, we have met once already, at Bretton Woods, and in a complicated, modern, interwoven society we have written an economic Magna Charta. Now we are meeting again, for we must agree on rules of procedure and by-laws. We are agreed in principle, as the parliamentarians would say; now we must agree on procedure. It should not be too difficult. It may be hard, but it is welcomed work. We must not sabotage the principles by protracted debate over procedure. We must not get so close to our own handwriting that we identify it and reargue it. We have returned to Savannah to implement our fundamental agreements, and there is no question in my mind but that we will. We must work eagerly and untiringly on the difficulties which attend this waging of the peace.

There is a simple axiom written in history. It is written in rock for everyone to read, written and rewritten when the blood of men who die in battle washes off the stone. It is: "If we want a better world we must be better people." How many men, since the first tick on the clock of time

have handed down that wisdom in a thousand languages. We were, when we gathered at Bretton Woods and when the sacrificial altar of tyranny was being pushed backward across the Rhine, actually better people. For a short space of three weeks we were making a better world by being better people. I hope, I believe, we still are better people. Until I saw these earnest humble faces of every color and culture I might have been apprehensive. You set my mind at ease. When I look I see the same compassionate honest men I saw before, and although I cannot read your inner thoughts, I am sure that the hearts of better men beat within you. This peace must not be a prelude. It must be solemn and continuing, compassionate and wise. We knew this at Bretton Woods—and we know it today.

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## Fourth Council Session of UNRRA

### MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

#### TO THE COUNCIL OF UNRRA:

In welcoming the members of the Council of UNRRA to the United States, I should like first to express my heartfelt sympathy to all those members whose countries are at the present time suffering from the acute food shortages afflicting the world. In this country our efforts are now solidly behind an emergency food economy program intended to release as large as possible a proportion of our food supplies for export to the starving people of the world.

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The Opening Plenary Meeting of the Fourth Session of the Council of UNRRA was convened at Atlantic City, N. J., on Mar. 15, 1946 by the Director General, Herbert H. Lehman.

As to the great work which UNRRA has undertaken, I know of no more encouraging evidence that international cooperation for peaceful ends is possible than the record of UNRRA's achievements.

Despite many obstacles and frustrations it has given clear proof that where the will of the United Nations is clearly expressed, prompt and effective action can be taken.

The United States played its part in the creation of UNRRA; it has given UNRRA its wholehearted support, and it is my purpose to see that this support shall be constantly maintained. I realize that now above all things UNRRA's needs must be met if the promises of the United Nations to the liberated countries are to be fulfilled.

I am taking every practicable measure to ensure that the United States does not fall behind the other supplying nations of the world in providing the scarce foods needed so desperately by the liberated countries. I regard UNRRA as the best instrument the United Nations could have to deal with this critical situation, and the emergency measures taken in this country will have as their purpose the further support of UNRRA.

I have no hesitation whatever in reaffirming the United States Government's most earnest desire to support UNRRA in every way in the completion of its immense task. The United Nations have been fortunate in having had created for them this organization which has operated so well in carrying out the first and most urgent task of peace. I trust that the high achievements of UNRRA will encourage the United Nations to regard UNRRA and the other international organizations which are now being created as an integral part of the machinery of the peace we are striving to ensure for the world.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

## *The Record of the Week*

# United States Military Strength— Its Relation to the United Nations and World Peace

By THE SECRETARY OF STATE

We Americans realize that the victory over the Axis was not an American victory alone. The victory was won by the peoples of many countries welded together in a powerful alliance. But as Americans we are proud that we contributed mightily to the defeat of the Fascists and Nazis in Europe and that we played the major part in the defeat of Japan.

Irish Americans in turn are aware that the blows struck by America were struck by Americans of every race and faith. But we of Irish blood take honest pride in the number of Kellys and Burkes and Sheas whose names appear in the war's roll of honor.

These Irish lads came from the cities and the farms, from the factories and the fields. They came to the decks of our ships, to the cockpits of our planes, and to the turrets of our tanks. They came to the landing barges and to the foxholes. And when their guns and the guns of their comrades began to sound, it became certain that victory would be ours.

Tonight time does not permit me to recite to you Friendly Sons of St. Patrick the names and deeds of these Irish heroes. But their names and deeds will not soon be forgotten, and there will be many an opportunity for more gifted Irish tongues to tell the tales of their gallantry.

I know that in these troubled days you are more anxious to look to the future than to the past—to consider what we must do now in order to insure that the sacrifices of these men have not been in vain.

Consequently, I desire to return to a subject to which I referred two weeks ago, the military strength of the United States.

We Americans love peace. We are a nation of

civilians, not soldiers. It is fundamental to our system of government that military authority be subordinate to civilian authority.

Even in the midst of total war, we have maintained this principle. The American soldiers and sailors who made military history from New Caledonia to Tokyo and from North Africa to Berlin were not professional soldiers and sailors. They were civilians in uniform.

This is a fine tradition. Having preserved it in war, we should not relinquish it in peace.

The problem is how to reconcile our civilian traditions with the necessity to maintain our military strength at a level to match our responsibilities in the world.

No nation is more willing than the United States to participate in any reasonable plan for the general reduction of armaments. But while other nations remain armed, the United States, in the interest of world peace, cannot disarm.

Between 1918 and 1941 there grew up in this country an important body of pacifist sentiment. The dominant theme of this movement was that the way to end war was not to prepare for war. It was argued that plain men the world over hated war and that there would be no more war if all these plain men simply refused ever to fight again.

If the United States were to scrap all its armaments and completely demobilize its army and navy, it was said, the force of its example would compel the rest of the world to follow suit. The peaceful instinct which underlay this point of view is an admirable one. The trouble with the idea is that it does not work.

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Address delivered before the Society of the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick in New York City on Mar. 16 and released to the press on the same date.



Without consciously deciding to do so, we actually tried it. By the time the Nazis attacked Poland in 1939 we had permitted our armed strength to dwindle to token proportions. When the war came and the realization slowly grew upon us that we would not be spared, we regretted that we were not prepared. The political parties then indicted each other for the lack of "preparedness." The argument was no substitute for weapons.

We learned that the example of weakness set by the United States did not compel Italy and Japan and Germany to follow suit. On the contrary, our weakness incited them to ever bolder aggressions. Only the accidents of history gave us two years in which to prepare before the blow fell at Pearl Harbor.

Those two years were not enough to repair the damage. We were not ready on December 7, 1941, and the consequence was that brave men died to regain the ground we could not hold in the first weeks of war.

This tragic experience makes us realize that weakness invites aggression. Weakness causes others to act as they would not act if they thought that our words were backed by strength.

Today there is grave danger that the sense of relief which accompanies the end of the war may cause us once again to do unwittingly what we would never do consciously.

No one in or out of government desires to extend for a single day more than is necessary the enforced separation of men from their families and from their peacetime business or employment.

But those who bear the responsibility for the security and welfare of the nation are alarmed at the possibility that sufficient numbers of physically fit men will not be available to replace those who have earned the right to return to their homes.

This is true now while the Selective Service Act is still in effect. If the Act is permitted to expire on May 15 of this year, the situation will become critical. It is imperative that the Act be extended at least for the period in which the Army and the Navy have the multiple responsibility for the occupation of Germany and Japan, for the protection of our surpluses overseas, for the continuing defense of the United States, and for the fulfilment of our commitments under the Charter.

It is even more important, in the long run, that we have at all times a reserve of trained men who can be called upon in case of need.

A number of methods have been proposed for obtaining this trained reserve. As Secretary of State, I desire to emphasize my whole-hearted and unequivocal endorsement of the proposal for universal military training.

It may be that the system proposed can be improved upon with experience in its administration. It is probable that as the years go by the system can be adapted to the demands of education and civilian employment in ways which will minimize friction and disruption in private lives. The important thing, however, is to get started with the plan, and to get started now.

An intelligently organized and administered system of universal military training will not undermine the American tradition of the subordination of military authority to civilian authority.

As for the effect of the training upon the boys, I can see no cause for alarm. It is not realistic to say, as some do, that a period of military training will turn our spirited and independent young men into unthinking brutes.

If we are to take the word of the old timers among the master sergeants and chief petty officers, American recruits have always displayed a phenomenal capacity to withstand education in the military way of doing things.

If we need fear anything about the effects upon our boys of a brief period of military training, it is that they will learn too little about being soldiers and sailors rather than too much.

If we are agreed that it is necessary for the United States to preserve an adequate degree of strength, it is well to remember that the only real alternative to universal military training is the maintenance of a large professional standing army and navy. This is an alternative which experience has shown to be a threat to civilian government. It is an alternative which we should accept only as a last resort.

A system of universal training will keep our armed forces from becoming fixed in their ways and habits. Teachers frequently learn from their pupils. Youngsters will not readily respond to training in methods which they know to be outmoded. Our defense in the modern world depends upon the mobility and flexibility of our armed forces and their ability to make use of and keep up with the advance of science.

It must be acknowledged that universal military training involves a major change in our society.

Consequently, the people of the United States have a right to know the purposes to which this reserve military strength might some day be put. This is a fair question. It deserves a fair answer.

The answer is simple. The United States is committed to the support of the Charter of the United Nations. Should the occasion arise, our military strength will be used to support the purposes and principles of the Charter.

I cannot emphasize too strongly that the United States looks to the United Nations as the path to enduring peace.

We do not propose to seek security in an alliance with the Soviet Union against Great Britain, or in an alliance with Great Britain against the Soviet Union.

We propose to stand with the United Nations in our efforts to secure equal justice for all nations and special privilege for no nation.

We must maintain our strength, therefore, for the primary purpose of preserving and using our influence in support of the Charter of the United Nations. We will not use our strength for aggressive purposes. Neither will we use it to support tyranny or special privilege.

I do not desire to conclude on a somber note. I firmly believe that the difficulties confronting the world, although they are serious, can be solved if all of us approach those difficulties in a spirit of conciliation and good-will.

There are powerful currents loose in the world today. But the currents of life cannot be stopped in their courses. We live in a moving and changing world.

There is no reason to fear an open and vigorous contest between our conception of democracy and other political faiths. The voice of democracy is as thrilling today as it was yesterday. In a conflict of ideas we can be supremely confident of victory.

The important thing to remember is that a war of ideas is not won by armies. In international life there can be progress without war if reason and not force is recognized as the test of progress.

The basic purpose of the United Nations is to make force the servant and not the master of reason, and to reject the ancient and discredited doctrine that might makes right.

After every great war there comes a period of anticlimax and disillusionment. Those who fight together expect, when the fighting is over, too

much from one another and are inclined to give too little to one another.

Those who have won the victory expect the millennium and feel that they should have the fruits of victory without further effort.

They forget that victory in war can only give the opportunity that would otherwise be denied, to live and work for the fruits of peace and freedom.

Having been forced to fight for military victory, they sometimes think that whatever they want should be taken by force instead of making their claims the basis for peaceful negotiation.

It takes time to pass from the psychology of war to the psychology of peace. We must have patience, as well as firmness. We must keep our feet on the ground. We cannot afford to lose our tempers.

I am deeply convinced that the peoples who fought together for freedom want to live together in peace. I am deeply convinced that the peoples of the United Nations are sincerely committed to the Charter.

There are always some of little faith; some who still believe that they cannot get their due except by force. There are others who still believe that ancient privilege will yield to nothing but force of arms.

But with firmness in the right not as we alone see it, but as the aggregate sentiments of mankind see it, and with patience and understanding we must and shall achieve a just and enduring peace for ourselves and all nations.

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## Inquiry on Reports of Soviet Military Movements

[Released to the press March 12]

The Department of State has received reports to the effect that during the last week additional Soviet armed forces and heavy military combat equipment have been moving southward from the direction of the Soviet frontier through Tabriz toward Tehran and toward the western border of Iran. This Government has inquired of the Soviet Government whether such movements have taken place and if so the reasons therefor.

# American Assistance to China

REMARKS BY GEORGE C. MARSHALL

[Released to the press March 16]

The Chinese people are engaged in an effort which I think should command the cooperation of the entire world. It is an effort almost without precedent. Their leaders are making daily progress towards the settlement by peaceful discussions of deep-seated and bitter conflicts over the past 20 years. They are succeeding in terminating the hostilities of the past 20 years. They have reached agreements and are now engaged in the business of demobilizing vast military forces and unifying and integrating the remaining forces into a national army. They have agreed to the basic principles for the achievement, in China, of political and economic advances which were centuries coming to western democracies.

If we are to have peace—if the world wants peace—there are compelling reasons why China's present effort must succeed, and its success will depend in a large measure on actions of other nations. If China is ignored or if there is scheming to thwart the development of unity and present aspirations, why, of course, their efforts inevitably will fail.

The United States, I think, at the present time is best able to render material assistance to China. I feel quite certain of the sympathetic interest of the American people in China; but I am not quite so certain as to their understanding, or the understanding of their political leaders, of the vital importance to the United States of the success of the present Chinese efforts toward unity and economic stability if we are to have the continued peace we hope for in the Pacific. Incidentally, I do not believe any nation can find justification for suspicion as to our motives in China. We are asking for no special preferences of any kind whatsoever regarding economic or similar matters. We are placing no price on our friendship. I must say, though, that we have a vital interest in a stable government in China and I am using the word "vital" in its accurate sense. The next few months are of tremendous importance to the Chi-

nese people and, I think, to the future peace of the world. I am now using that term in its longer sense; that is, through the years. Stable governments in Asia are of great importance to us, not to mention what they mean to the people who have suffered to a degree which the Chinese have during the past decade.

I have met on every hand the most generous reception, the most remarkable reception, I might say, and it seemed to me a very understanding cooperation toward whatever efforts I might be making. The situation of course has been most complicated throughout my brief stay in China, first by the disturbed conditions in this country and in the army in the Pacific, and then later by the critical state of affairs in Manchuria. Despite these difficulties I think tremendous progress has been made.

I would like to have you understand something of an organization that has been established in Peiping which we call Executive Headquarters. That is the most important instrument we have in China at the present time. Agreements are all very well, but unless you have a means for carrying them out, particularly when they are intended to resolve bitter differences of large groups of people, you must have some means of implementing those agreements. So we have in Peiping a headquarters consisting of three commissions, the chairman of which is an American, the other two members representing the Chinese Government and the Communist Party. Then we have an American Chief of Staff and under him is a group of about 250 officers. The core of the organization is American, with the representatives of the National Government on one side and the Communists on the other, and they are brought together within this framework of an American staff. They are represented in the field throughout the critical portions of China by teams of three men—one American, one governmental representative and one Communist representative—and the force and effect of these agreements and the detailed orders to



carry them into effect are in that way carried down on the ground at the scene of the trouble, whether it is fighting; whether it is restoration of communications; whether it is relieving the encirclement of a city; the evacuation of Japanese; or, as is now coming up, the demobilization, reorganization, and integration of the armed forces in China. We would have gotten nowhere without that headquarters. It is absolutely essential in every step of the way in connection with these agreements which have application to the military situation, which of course includes communications.

Now the last evening I was in China, up to 10 minutes before my departure, we were reaching agreements regarding sending these teams into Manchuria. We reached a general agreement and they had certain details to work out after my departure. They should be on their way in now. It is of great importance that they get there as soon as possible. You must understand that it is exceedingly difficult, with the best intentions in the world, to transmit orders where there are very limited radio communications, almost no highway communications over these great distances in these isolated localities, and where in many cases the forces are not well-knit organized units. I found it necessary to make a trip of about 3,500 miles to the principal region where there was still trouble. I was accompanied by the Government representative and part of his staff, and the Communist representative with part of his staff. I found in the case of the latter that they hadn't seen some of the leaders for two years and had very limited communications with them from time to time. We were able to resolve almost every difficulty once we got the people together. It was very remarkable how quickly we could straighten out what seemingly were impossible conditions and which had their tragic effect on the Chinese people. A single conference of a few hours in an afternoon would raise the encirclement of what amounted to 10 or 12 besieged cities where people were starving. It only took that long to straighten out, but until we arrived nothing could be done.

Now in Manchuria they have had no representative of the Executive Headquarters up to this time. The situation has been very fluid with troops moving here and there and, of course, all sorts of minor clashes occurring. There is no doubt whatever in my mind that in many instances, particularly on the Communist side, they are almost unaware of

the agreements we have reached; therefore, it is most important that we have these teams appear in that country as quickly as possible. I would like to say the American officers in these small groups are rendering a very remarkable service not only under the difficult conditions of the task but under extremely difficult conditions of life. I repeat again that without the headquarters of the nature that we have established in Peiping with its representatives, it would be literally impossible to carry out any of these agreements, even with the best intentions in the world at the top.

I saw General MacArthur in Japan and talked over with him the representation of Chinese troops in the army of occupation. He was very happy to have them and I think you will shortly read of an announcement by the Generalissimo to that effect.

## Reply to Soviet Inquiry on U. S. Aide-Memoire to Bulgaria

[Released to the press March 11]

*Note from the Secretary of State to the Soviet Embassy in Washington delivered on March 10, 1946*

I acknowledge the receipt of your communication of March 7, 1946 with reference to an *aide-mémoire* delivered by this Government to the Political Representative of Bulgaria in the United States on February 22, 1946.<sup>1</sup>

I have taken note of the comments of your Government in this connection, particularly the charges that this action by the United States Government is in violation of the decision in regard to Bulgaria taken by the three Foreign Ministers at Moscow in December 1945, and that the United States Government is encouraging the representatives of the Bulgarian opposition "to resist" the Moscow decision. The Soviet Government also states that the presentation of that *aide-mémoire* was a unilateral step taken without prior coordination with other interested Governments which participated in the Moscow Decision.

As indicated in the *aide-mémoire* under reference, the United States Government was motivated in this matter by a desire to correct a misunderstanding which appeared to exist in various quarters in Bulgaria as to the position of the United States Government in regard to the Moscow de-

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1946, p. 447.

cision concerning Bulgaria. The Moscow Agreement provided for procedures looking toward inclusion of two representatives of other democratic groups in the Bulgarian Government. These were to be truly representative of the parties not included in the Government, and to be really suitable and work loyally with the Government. It did not occur to the Government of the United States, nor does it now seem conceivable, that such participation would be or should be on terms other than those mutually acceptable to the participants. Otherwise the participation would be upon a basis acceptable only to the participants on one side. Plainly the participation was not to be *pro forma* or created by pressure. It was and is the earnest hope of the United States Government that, meeting in a spirit of conciliation, the Bulgarian Government and the opposition would be able to find a mutually acceptable basis for the implementation of the Moscow Decision.

It is therefore with considerable surprise that the United States Government learns that its statement to the Bulgarian Government of so fundamental and simple a proposition is regarded by the Soviet Government as a departure from the agreement. As understood by this Government that statement is the very essence of the agreement.

With reference to the Soviet Government's contention that this step was taken unilaterally and without prior coordination with other interested Governments, the United States Government desires to call the attention of the Soviet Government to the conversations held in London on February 16, 1946 between Mr. Cohen, Counselor of the Department of State, and Mr. Vyshinski, Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. On that occasion Mr. Cohen on instructions informed the Soviet Government of the views of the United States Government in this matter as subsequently set forth in the *aide-mémoire* of February 22. Similar conversations were held by Mr. Cohen in London with the British Government.

Concerning the statement by the Soviet Government that the United States Government's *aide-mémoire* constitutes encouragement to the representatives of the Bulgarian opposition "to resist" the Moscow Decision and that the same tendency has previously been shown by the United States Representative in Bulgaria, the United States Government has at no time taken any action in

this matter which could be interpreted as inconsistent with the friendly spirit of cooperation which motivated its agreement to that decision. The activities of the United States Representative in Bulgaria have been under the instructions he has received from his Government directed toward impressing upon all parties in Bulgaria the need for this same spirit of cooperation. It is the sincere desire of the United States Government that in this spirit an implementation of the Moscow Agreement regarding Bulgaria will be achieved.

## Reply to French Proposal on Spanish Situation

[Released to the press March 11]

*Note delivered to the French Government on March 9, 1946 by the American Ambassador in Paris upon instructions of the Secretary of State*

The Government of the United States has given careful consideration to the French Government's note of February 27, drawing attention to certain recent developments in Spain, stating that the French Government was of the opinion that the situation in Spain should be submitted for examination to the Security Council and enquiring whether the United States Government would agree to associate itself with the French Government in doing so.

The United States Government holds firmly to the opinion that any Member of the United Nations should bring any dispute or any situation, which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, to the attention of the Security Council whenever that Member feels that such a course is warranted under the provisions of the Charter.

It is the view of the United States Government that, in considering whether it would bring a situation to the attention of the Security Council or would associate itself with another government in such action, it should have in its possession facts which, when examined in the light of the pertinent provisions of the Charter, afford reason to believe that a situation exists, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Government of the United States has repeatedly made clear its attitude in regard to the present regime in Spain. It supported the resolu-

tion in San Francisco introduced by the Mexican Delegation to the effect that a country should not be eligible to membership in the United Nations if its government had been assisted to power by the armed forces of countries which fought against the United Nations. The United States was a party to the Potsdam Declaration, applying this principle in specific terms to Spain. The United States moreover supported the Panamanian Resolution adopted in January 1946 at the first meeting of the General Assembly to the effect that the members of the United Nations Organization should act in accordance with the letter and the spirit of these declarations in the conduct of their relations with Spain.

The Government of the United States has on numerous occasions stated its view that there cannot be satisfactory relations between the United States and Spain so long as the present regime continues in power in Spain. It frankly feels that a change of regime in Spain is not only highly desirable from the standpoint of the Spanish people themselves, but essential if Spain is to take that place in the family of nations which rightfully belongs to her. At the same time, the Government of the United States is compelled to say that it regards the change of the existing regime in Spain as a task for the Spanish people themselves. It is the privilege and the responsibility of the people of Spain to determine the form of government under which Spain wishes to live and to choose the leaders of their government.

While the Government of the United States feels strongly that a change of regime in Spain is long overdue, it is compelled to reiterate that it is for the Spanish people themselves in their own way to bring about such a change. It is the earnest hope of the Government of the United States that the Spanish people will bring about such a change at the earliest possible moment and by peaceful means.

On the basis of its present analysis of all the facts in its possession concerning the Spanish situation, including those mentioned in the note from the French Government of February 27, 1946, the Government of the United States does not believe that a situation exists, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. It is possible that such a situation may develop, but it was the hope of the United States Government that the recent ac-

tion it took in concert with the French Government and the British Government would serve to retard such development. Therefore the United States Government as at present advised does not feel that it can associate itself with the French Government in now bringing the question to the attention of the Security Council.

The United States Government is of course prepared to give careful study to any additional information which the French Government may care to furnish in connection with its proposal. In considering such information, the United States Government would appreciate particularly being informed more precisely as to how the French Government believes that the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the Security Council, the type of action which in the opinion of the French Government the Security Council would be in a position to take, and any specific recommendations for action which the French Government may envisage making to the Security Council for the solution of the problem as submitted.

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## Discontinuance of United Maritime Authority

### MEETING OF EXECUTIVE BOARD

[Released to the press March 11]

The United Maritime Executive Board consisting of representatives of the 18 governments which had acceded to the "Agreement on Principles Having Reference to the Co-ordinated Control of Merchant Shipping" signed August 5, 1944, met in London February 4 through 11, 1946 and discussed steps which appeared necessary to complete the common tasks which had been assumed under that agreement. The 18 Governments represented are Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Greece, India, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslavia.

The Board was unanimously of the opinion that the return to normal processes of international shipping business should not be retarded, but was similarly of the opinion that difficulties and problems might arise after the termination on March 2 of the Agreement on Principles unless measures



were taken to insure the orderly transportation of certain cargoes. Therefore, after thorough consideration, the United Maritime Executive Board adopted machinery for the discontinuance of United Maritime Authority controls March 2, 1946, and also unanimously recommended to the member governments through their respective delegations that such governments should enter into a temporary agreement (expiring October 31, 1946) providing for:

(1) The meeting of ocean-transportation requirements of UNRRA and of liberated areas in an orderly and efficient manner, the adjustment of ship space and cargoes to be effected by a working committee in Washington and a subcommittee in Canada. There will also be a coordinating and review committee in London to consider UNRRA's requirements for loading and to keep the tonnage situation constantly under review, performing both such functions in respect to loading areas other than the United States and Canada.

(2) A temporary consultative council for the purpose of studying any shipping problem (other than problems within the terms of reference of other established governmental conferences or associations active in the field) which may arise during the period of transition from United Maritime Authority controls to free commercial shipping, such council to possess no executive powers.

The recommendations state that it is the intention that the private shipping industry should collaborate and assist in devising ways and means to implement the common objectives referred to in (1) and (2) above.

The agreement is intended to preserve on a voluntary basis, and until the greater part of the UNRRA and liberated area shipments have been made, those aspects of the United Maritime Authority which relate to the programming of relief and rehabilitation cargoes and the assignment of shipping to carry those cargoes. It does not continue beyond March 2, 1946 the aspects of the United Maritime Authority agreement relating to controls over shipping.

It is believed that the new agreement will be of material assistance in assuring the prompt ocean transportation of food and fuel and other commodities to areas where they are urgently needed for the preservation of human lives.

## TEXT OF AGREEMENT

### PART "A"

1. That all nations who have regularly contributed tonnage to the common tasks shall continue to provide shipping for the common tasks of relief and rehabilitation.

#### Arrangements for Dry Cargo From U.S. and Canadian Loading Areas

2. That a Contributory Nations Committee consisting of representatives of nations contributing tonnage to provide shipping space for relief and rehabilitation programmes from the United States and Canada shall be established in Washington.

3. That UNRRA and liberated nations requiring assistance from the Contributory Pool referred to in (4) below, shall programme their shipping requirements and submit them to the Washington Committee established in (2) above. The procedure to be followed is set out in the Appendix.

4. That at the outset of the agreement each contributory nation shall declare to the Washington Committee the maximum and minimum monthly sailings or tonnage it will contribute for the period of the agreement. The tonnage thus contributed is referred to herein as the Contributory Pool.

#### Arrangements for Dry Cargo From Other Loading Areas

5. That a Co-ordinating and Review Committee representative of Nations accepting Part "A" of this agreement shall be set up in London.

This Committee:

(a) shall consider U.N.R.R.A.'s requirements for loading in areas other than the United States and Canada. The nations accepting Part "A" of this agreement recognise the necessity for meeting such requirements to the best of their ability and through their representatives on the Committee shall co-ordinate the provision of tonnage they are able to make available for these programmes.

(b) shall keep the tonnage situation in loading areas other than the United States and Canada constantly under review. Recognising the necessity for an adequate supply of tonnage for loading in these areas the nations represented shall authorise the Committee to consider and recommend the measures that should be taken to assist

the fulfilment of the programmes affected in the event that normal commercial channels are failing to ensure an adequate supply of tonnage.

### General

6. That nations needing shipping assistance other than that secured from the Contributory Pool, shall make suitable arrangements for the procurement of tonnage through commercial channels or may request it from other nations. The nations from whom tonnage is requested shall make all reasonable efforts to make available the requested shipping space at fair, reasonable and compensatory rates, subject to the reservation that they need not supply such tonnage if it is to be used in a manner contrary to the interests of the nation upon whom the request has been made.

### APPENDIX TO PART "A"

1. To maintain without interruption the maximum flow of relief and rehabilitation cargoes from the United States and Canada, a Contributory Nations' Committee shall be established in Washington as provided in (2) of Part "A".

2. With respect to loadings from Canadian ports, the Washington Committee shall collaborate with a Canadian Sub-Committee to be established in Montreal.

3. U.N.R.R.A. and each liberated Nation requiring shipping assistance for the carriage of such cargoes, shall submit to this Committee by the 1st of each month, its total programme of cargo loadings in the United States and Canada showing the number of coal, grain or other full, bulk cargoes, and the number of general cargoes programmed for loading during the following month, and estimates in the same form for the next two months. The programme for the specific month should also show the number, nationality, and total cargo capacity of vessels already available to the programming claimant for loading during that month.

4. By the 10th of each month each contributing Nation shall notify the Committee as to the amount of tonnage that it expects to have available, such tonnage to be within the maxima and minima as agreed in accordance with (4) of Part "A," and by the 15th of each month shall confirm the actual tonnage to be supplied against the following month's requirements, such tonnage to be stated separately in liner sailings and in tramps.

5. In arranging and determining the amount of

tonnage to be provided under 4 of this Appendix, individual members of the Committee shall at all times communicate direct with their respective Nations, who shall, in considering requests for tonnage to load in the United States and Canada, make every effort to avoid causing a deficiency in the supply of tonnage required for other loading areas.

6. To meet each month's berthing requirements in the United States, the Committee shall allocate all of the agreed available tonnage through the established machinery of the War Shipping Administration, so that appropriate co-ordination with respect to loading facilities, inland transportation and availability of cargoes may be secured and the maximum flow of cargo for the month achieved, together with the most efficient use of the shipping available.

### PART "B"

7. That:

(A) accepting Governments should meet periodically for discussions in a United Maritime Consultative Council for the purpose of exchanging information to the end that individual governments may be enabled to frame their own policies in the post-UMA period in the light of the knowledge of the policies of other governments.

(B) the Council may undertake the consideration and study, for the purpose of making appropriate recommendations to member governments, of any problems in the international shipping field, which may be referred to it and which do not come within the terms of reference of other established governmental conferences or associations active in the field.

(C) it is the intention that the shipping industry should collaborate and assist in devising ways and means to implement the common objectives stated in (A) and (B).

(D) meetings of the Council should be held at such times and places as the Council may determine. A chairman for each meeting should be designated by the Government of the nation where such meeting is to be held. The Council should determine its own procedure.

(E) the United Maritime Consultative Council should have no executive powers.

(F) this part of the agreement should be open for acceptance by governments whether or not they accept Part "A".

(Continued on page 499)

## Resumption of Postal Service With Germany Explored

[Released to the press March 12]

The Department's attention has been drawn to reports appearing in the newspapers to the effect that restricted international postal service between Germany and the rest of the world will be reestablished on April 1.

The question of the resumption of postal communications with Germany has been under consideration by the appropriate agencies of this Government and the Allied Control Council in Berlin for some months. April 1 has been set as the target date for reopening of service, and it is hoped that this objective can be met. However, it must be emphasized that April 1 is not a definite date for the resumption of service and that unsolved problems may defer the opening for a short time.

The question of the type of service is still under consideration. It is unlikely that the initial service will be for anything other than postcards or very brief personal communications.

As soon as a definite date has been determined for the resumption of postal service with Germany, a further press release will be issued.

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### TERRILL—Continued from page 458.

easy to construct for statutory purposes. Over a period of time, such an agreement may be more easily attained than can be imagined today. Traditions, customs, legal systems, and administrative procedures, however, are too diverse among countries to entertain a sanguine hope now for this achievement in a short time. Even if this end could be accomplished, the greatest common denominator of accord among the governments might still be quite small.

Under the second form of agreement—as outlined in the *Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment*—the governments would agree in principle as to the desirability of abating restrictive business practices in international trade and would undertake individual as well as concerted action to this end. They would also agree as to the enumeration of certain practices which are considered as most likely to interfere with the attainment of the objectives of the International Trade Organization. The Proposals suggest a special commission for international business

practices to be established under the ITO and to be charged with the function of receiving complaints from governments or private business firms (with the consent of their respective governments) that the objectives of the Organization are being frustrated because of the operation of restrictive agreements. After a preliminary review of such complaints, the Organization would request further data from member governments and, if warranted, would recommend remedial action to be taken individually or cooperatively by the interested governments. It would also have the authority to request member states to consult as to appropriate solutions in any given dispute concerning business practices and to cooperate in giving effect to remedial action.

The merit of this proposed agreement lies in its flexibility and its prospects for early operation. Instead of requiring advance understanding that certain practices in and of themselves are to be specifically outlawed, it would set forth a number of restrictive practices which experience has shown to be both frequent and detrimental in their effects and which the individual governments and the international agency should consider as *prima facie* in conflict with the larger objectives of commercial policy. This listing would serve to indicate agreement that certain practices are generally suspect and may definitely prove to be objectionable under particular circumstances. Through the device of an international agency which would examine individual complaints as they arose and which would make appropriate recommendations to member governments of ITO, the possible deadlock of definition of what precisely constitutes restrictive practice may thereby be avoided and a positive international instrument brought into early operation during the formative period of post-war commercial relations.

Like the first form of agreement described above, the plan outlined in the Proposals would commit signatory governments to outlaw restrictive business practices in international trade and would require them to act both individually and collectively. It would not necessarily oblige them, however, to take remedial action upon the existence of specified practices, but it would require them to act when the violations listed had specified effects. This realistic approach provides a rather wide area for intergovernmental understanding and accord and offers a promising basis for further consideration by the governments of the United Nations.



## Proposed Wool Program

At the present time there is a serious world-wide wool situation. The United States Government must develop and carry out a wool program that will adequately safeguard the interests of growers, merchants, and consumers. Such a program must also be consistent with our general foreign economic policy.

Abroad the war stopped trade between the principal wool-producing countries of the Southern Hemisphere and the principal wool-consuming countries on the Continent of Europe and in Asia. This has resulted in the accumulation of large stocks of raw wool in foreign countries. The distribution of these accumulated stocks and of future clips will be retarded until transportation, coal mining, manufacturing, and international trade can be rehabilitated, despite the great consumer need for wool textiles and clothing. In view of these facts, the Governments of Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa have formed an agency called the Inter-Governmental Joint Wool Organization for the twofold purpose of protecting prices to producers in Empire countries and of disposing of the accumulated surplus of Empire wool. It is said that this agency will be prepared to operate for a period of 10 years, or longer if necessary, to complete the liquidation of these stocks. While the Joint Wool Organization is in operation it is understood that wool produced in these countries will be sold to the established trade in the normal manner as long as prices equal or exceed the stabilization levels established by the Organization. When the wool cannot be sold to the trade at such prices it will be purchased by the Organization at the stabilization prices. It is to the advantage of wool growers in the United States to have wool prices stabilized in the major producing countries abroad. Our growers are somewhat apprehensive, however, lest the desire of the Joint Wool Organization to speed liquidation might result in undue pressure to sell in the United States.

[Here follows a discussion of the domestic wool situation, proposed legislation, and the relation of the Commodity Credit Corporation to the wool program.]

In addition to such legislative program, it would seem desirable to have the Executive agencies undertake the development of an international wool agreement in collaboration with the various interested foreign governments, to provide for coordinated action and more unified supervision of world wool marketing and price policies from the standpoints of producers, consumers, and international trade. I am asking the Executive agencies to determine the willingness of foreign governments to participate in such undertaking. In the meantime, it is hoped that consultations can be held with foreign wool agencies which will provide for a mutual understanding of objectives and activities in selling policies.

The above program will, in my opinion, afford domestic wool growers the protection and assistance to which they are properly entitled under this country's general trade and agricultural policies. The program will tend to encourage wool consumption in the United States, and will be consistent with our general foreign economic policy. In accordance with the views you have so frequently expressed, this country also should cooperate with foreign producing and consuming countries in efforts to encourage wool consumption abroad.

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## The Proclaimed List

[Released to the press March 16]

The Secretary of State, acting in conjunction with the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Acting Director of the Office of Inter-American Affairs, on March 16 issued Supplement 2 to Revision X of the Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals.

Part I of Cumulative Supplement No. 2 contains 14 additional listings in the other American republics and 38 deletions; Part II contains 10 additional listings outside the American republics and two deletions.

In reply to a letter of Jan. 5, 1946 from Joseph C. O'Mahoney, United States Senator from Wyoming, the President transmitted with a letter of Mar. 11, 1946 a discussion of the proposed wool program. See S. Doc. 140.

## The Citizen's Role in Foreign Policy

*A discussion of the citizen's role in foreign policy by Representative Edith Nourse Rogers, Republican, Mass., member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; Representative Joseph F. Ryter, Democrat, Congressman-at-large from Connecticut, member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; and Francis H. Russell, Acting Director of the Office of Public Affairs, Department of State. The text of their conversation on the air, March 16, which was released to the press on that date, is presented below. The broadcast was another program of the Department of State in the NBC University of the Air series entitled "Our Foreign Policy." Sterling Fisher, director of the NBC University of the Air was chairman of their discussion. The discussion was adapted for radio by Selden Menefee.*

FISHER: It is quite appropriate that "Our Foreign Policy" should visit Boston, since Massachusetts is one of the States where this series is used as the basis for an extension course by the Department of Education. . . . Now, for more than a year we have been dealing with our foreign policy in operation. But we have never answered this basic question: What can the average citizen do to help formulate and carry out our Nation's foreign policy? Here is a query that crops up frequently in our mailbag, and this is an excellent occasion to deal with it—before a conference of educators. . . . But first, Congressman Ryter, let me ask you: Just how important *is* popular understanding of our foreign policy?

RYTER: Popular understanding of what goes on in the world is more important today than ever before—not only here in America, but in Europe, and everywhere in the world.

FISHER: Why?

RYTER: Because in a shrinking world such as we live in, we must have mutual understanding among nations if we are to avoid war.

FISHER: Mr. Russell, do you think the *people* understand the importance of keeping in touch with foreign affairs?

RUSSELL: I certainly do. Judging from the amount of mail that comes into the State Department, the people are concerned with our foreign relations as never before. They want to *do* something about foreign policy. They want a voice in it. As a former resident of this State I know that the Massachusetts law provides for popular referendum on matters of public interest including

foreign affairs. Through this law, the people have expressed their approval of the World Court and world federation.

ROGERS: I've seen interest in world problems growing in my own district in recent years. There is a great deal more discussion of foreign affairs than ever before.

FISHER: Why do you suppose that is, Congressman Rogers?

ROGERS: Well, the war, of course, and especially the influence of the men who have come back from overseas. As time goes on more and more of them will become leaders in their communities. They will want a strong America and a strong, consistent foreign policy. They won't be satisfied with platitudes.

RYTER: One question people often ask is, do we *have* a foreign policy?

FISHER: Well, Congressman Ryter, *do* we?

RYTER: I think we have a basic policy in the Atlantic Charter, although I'm not always sure that we follow through on it.

FISHER: Congressman Rogers, you're one of the senior members of Congress. You're the second-ranking Republican in the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the ranking Republican on the Veterans Committee. You've traveled abroad a great deal, studying foreign affairs. Do *you* think we have a foreign policy?

ROGERS: I think we have certain *objectives*, but we do not always follow them. And we have a number of *policies*, such as solidarity of the Americas, the "Open Door" in Asia, and so on.

RUSSELL: I believe President Truman's Navy

Day speech of last October was an excellent summary of the general principles that govern our foreign policy.

FISHER: Mr. Russell, can you summarize that summary for us?

RUSSELL: The President started by saying that our policy is based on friendly partnership with all peaceful nations, and full support for the United Nations Organization. Then he listed 12 points. The gist of them was about as follows: No territorial expansion for the United States, or for any country unless it accords with the wishes of the people concerned; self-government for all people, including eventually those of colonial areas and enemy countries; freedom of expression and religion; freedom of the sea and freedom of access to raw materials of all nations; world-wide economic cooperation to build world trade; and the "Good Neighbor Policy" in the Western Hemisphere.

RYTER: Those are general principles. But very often we improvise ways of carrying them out and hope for the best. We compromise too often.

RUSSELL: I agree, Mr. Ryter, that a set of general principles cannot be regarded as a foreign policy. They are only a point of departure. They indicate the direction in which we want to go.

ROGERS: Let me add one point to the list of objectives you cited, Mr. Russell. We need to look out for our own military and economic security. We have not always done that.

FISHER: But what about the citizen's role in all this? He's the central figure in this broadcast . . . Representative Ryter, do you think your constituents are well informed about our foreign relations?

RYTER: Not as well as they should be. One sign of that is the very general tendency to call people who disagree with you either fascists or communists. People are too much inclined to sound off on any issue without even examining the facts.

FISHER: Can you cite an example, Mr. Ryter?

RYTER: The British loan—or rather agreement, since it's more than a loan—is one example. There is too much of a tendency to be for or "agin" it right off the bat—to reach a hasty conclusion which we may regret later, at our leisure.

FISHER: Now, Congressman Rogers, let me ask you this: Do you think the State Department has done as much as it should to impart information to your constituents, say, in Belmont, Massachusetts?

ROGERS: No, Mr. Fisher, I *do not*. The State Department could do a great deal more than it has to get the facts to the people—and to their representatives in Congress. I believe its officials should take more initiative than they have to keep *Congress* well informed. And the House of Representatives should get just as much information as the Senate. We may not ratify treaties, but after all we are very close to the people.

RYTER: That's right—the State Department has often neglected to give congressional committees the information they need to act intelligently.

FISHER: But, Congressman Ryter, what bearing does this have on Bill Johnson, our average citizen?

RYTER: Plenty, Mr. Fisher. If members of Congress are well-informed, they will discuss the issues more intelligently on the floor. Committee members will be better able to answer questions on pending legislation. And don't forget, the average Congressman broadcasts to his home district every two or three weeks and sends material to the newspapers in his district on these things. So you can get information to the people through their representatives on the Hill.

FISHER: Mr. Russell, can you speak for the State Department on this point?

RUSSELL: I certainly agree with Congressman Rogers and Congressman Ryter that the Department should do everything possible to give Members of Congress and the American people all the information possible. I think that great steps have been taken in both of these directions in recent years. Some of the top officers in the Department, including the Secretary, spend a substantial part of their time on the Hill. Assistant Secretaries have been known to appear before three or four committees in a single day.

FISHER: It's a wonder they have time to get their work done in the Department.

RUSSELL: You have to remember that during the last two years the State Department has had the heaviest legislative program of any government agency in history. Both Congress and the Department, as well as the American people, have taken historic strides forward in formulating and implementing a new foreign policy. We answer many requests from Congressmen for information or for an expression of the Department's policies every week. And the Department makes an annual report to Congress, when the budget is being considered . . .

RYTER: Nevertheless I think that in the House



of Representatives we hear from the State Department altogether too infrequently between budget hearings. I think we should have more frequent and regular reports to appropriate committees on various aspects of the Department's work.

RUSSELL: Of course the State Department has regular liaison with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and leading members of that Committee and of your own House Foreign Affairs Committee have been sent to various international conferences—at Mexico City, San Francisco, London. You were at Mexico City, I believe, Mrs. Rogers.

ROGERS: That's right. But I'd like to add this: Our Foreign Affairs Committee doesn't hold enough hearings to keep in touch with the Department's work. In 1941, just before the war, we held only two hearings in a five-month period, except for those that I forced by introducing resolutions of inquiry.

RUSSELL: I'm sure that the State Department would be glad to send people up to discuss its work with your Committee as often as you wish to invite them. Of course the Department has to be careful that it is not accused of lobbying when it tries to make this information available to Congress. At least a half-dozen departments and agencies in Washington have been accused of that. Nevertheless, I agree that some way should be found for bringing about as close a relationship as possible between the Department and Congress. An effective foreign policy requires it.

FISHER: Now, I don't like to keep bringing this up, but how about Bill Johnson, the average citizen? Mr. Russell, what is the State Department doing for him?

RUSSELL: I think that's a key question. There's got to be a maximum flow of information to Congress—but that isn't enough. We have to do what we can to meet the popular demand for information on foreign policy more *directly*. We use such means as publication of basic materials, press conferences, conferences with representatives of labor, business, farm groups, religious groups, women's groups, and foreign policy groups; and participation in this and other radio programs, as well as occasional talks by officers of the Department at the invitation of private organizations. I hasten to add, however, that we are able to handle about one out of every 25 requests that are received for talks.

FISHER: Do you think, Mr. Russell, that this sort of program reaches a very large part of the American public?

RUSSELL: Yes, over a period of time. The public debate over the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and the United Nations Charter was a good example. We sent out hundreds of thousands of copies of these documents to people who requested them. The press, radio, and even the movies told the story of Dumbarton Oaks. The great majority of people in America became familiar with the Proposals in a general way. At San Francisco, representatives of forty-two leading national and civic organizations actually suggested several clauses which were incorporated into the United Nations Charter. Similar steps have been taken to secure public participation in the formulation of the UNESCO Charter, the International Trade Organization proposals and others.

FISHER: Congressman Ryter, is the State Department doing its information job to your satisfaction?

RYTER: Well, Mr. Fisher, I think the information work of the State Department is valuable. But it has its dangers, too. People are apt to think that information put out by a government department is propaganda. That's partly because the information released is so highly selected.

ROGERS: I don't believe the State Department does as much as it should to get all the facts to the people. If the public had had all the facts in the years preceding the war, it's my firm belief that war would have been averted. The neutrality legislation, which the administration asked for and which I opposed, lulled America to sleep. As a result, we were very weak in a military way. Of course I realize, Mr. Russell, that you have to use a certain amount of discretion in dealing with questions involving our security, in order not to aggravate a troubled situation. But let's have full information, and not rely on the atom bomb to keep the peace, as America relied on the Neutrality Act before.

RUSSELL: Mrs. Rogers, you and Mr. Ryter have just expressed very neatly a dilemma which the State Department faces, and perhaps always will. If we release information, we're called propagandists; if we don't release it, we're accused of secrecy. We get criticized both ways—but we keep trying to steer the middle course.

FISHER: It seems to me there is a tendency toward more frankness, toward releasing more com-

plete information, in recent months. I'm thinking of the State Department's exposure of Nazi influences in Argentina and Spain.

RYTER: Even there, Mr. Fisher, the long delay in publishing the facts made it seem as if the purpose were to justify our policy, rather than to enlighten the public. . . .

RUSSELL: I can say this, Congressman: The State Department's policy is to release as much information as possible, and as quickly as possible, in so far as it does not interfere with the attainment of the basic objectives of our foreign policy.

RYTER: But a maximum of information should be made available to members of Congress, even if it can't all be made public.

RUSSELL: I agree.

FISHER: Now to get down to our main question: What can the average citizen *do* about all this? First of all, Congressman Rogers, how do you recommend that he *inform* himself about international affairs, so he can act intelligently?

ROGERS: Well, Mr. Fisher, since this broadcast originates at a meeting of educators, let me say that teachers have a great responsibility in this regard. Surely they ought to be better equipped to sift the facts about international affairs than most people. I believe they should try very hard to present an unprejudiced picture of foreign affairs to their students.

RUSSELL: By so doing they will bring about an interest in foreign affairs not only among the children but among their parents.

ROGERS: Yes, Mr. Russell, parents are always interested in the activities of their children. But the teacher's responsibilities go ever further. He—or she—should take an active part in the intellectual life of his community. Teachers have a lot to contribute, on both international and domestic affairs, and I'm convinced that their teaching would be improved by more of an exchange of ideas with other sections of the community.

RYTER: The matter of where teachers—and other citizens—get their information on foreign affairs is also important. They ought to rely not only on government hand-outs, but also on the press, radio, magazines, and the like—independent sources that are, like Caesar's wife, "beyond suspicion." Or should be, if they're not.

ROGERS: That is essential, Mr. Ryter. If you're going to arrive at the truth, you have to check all these sources against each other.

RYTER: No one should accept government releases as gospel truth. That's the road to totalitarianism. The citizen should read and listen to everything he can lay his hands on, talk it over, and make up his own mind.

RUSSELL: That's exactly what the State Department tries to encourage, Congressman Ryter. We make information available when it's requested or when we think it's needed, but we certainly want people to get facts from other sources as well. And we want to see free discussion of world issues, because we believe that if this occurs, the cream of the opinion will rise to the top. It's pretty obvious today that foreign affairs are everybody's business. If everyone doesn't take part in shaping our foreign policy, democracy will suffer.

FISHER: Congressman Rogers, you mentioned that our communities need a better understanding of international affairs. Can you give us an example of how that can be brought about?

ROGERS: Why yes, Mr. Fisher—right here in Massachusetts. About a year ago the city of Worcester ran a very successful project called "Worcester and the World". For several months a leading member of the United Nations was honored each week . . .

FISHER: That started, incidentally, with the program manager of the local radio station, who got the cooperation of the Mayor . . .

ROGERS: That's right, but the whole town took it up. In fact, they were very enthusiastic about it. Each Monday, Mayor William Bennett would proclaim that it was "Australia Week", or "Netherlands Week," or "Norway Week", and the flag of the country that was honored was raised over the City Hall. The radio carried special programs, ranging from recipes to folk music, the papers carried special articles, and the libraries and stores held special exhibits on the nation that was being honored. The ministers frequently related their sermons to the country under discussion. Prominent representatives of the nation were invited to visit Worcester during the week, to speak to civic groups and deliver a public lecture at Clark University. Often short-wave broadcasts were arranged by the local station during the week, on which Worcester's civic leaders exchanged greetings and information with people in the other countries. Before the week was over, the people of Worcester felt much closer to the people of an

allied country than ever before. Mayor Bennett put it this way: "We must somehow understand the Chinese, the American, the Pole and the South American are alike human beings, with a common desire to live in peace and security . . . Lack of understanding breeds distrust, suspicion, and ultimately hatred and warfare."

FISHER: That was a very ambitious program. . . .

ROGERS: But very much worth while, Mr. Fisher, and one that other cities and towns could very well copy.

RUSSELL: Congressman Ryter, I had a very interesting experience in your State only two weeks ago. I was invited to New Canaan, Connecticut, to talk to several civic groups about this very subject—the citizen's role in foreign policy. I found the people very much interested in these matters. All that's required is for someone, or some group, to start the ball rolling.

RYTER: I think that interest is typical of most towns in my State, Mr. Russell. And I know that the schools, in Hartford and other places, are constantly conducting studies and projects on other countries. The social sciences, in particular, do a good job of this.

RUSSELL: And interest usually continues, once it is aroused. In New Canaan, a permanent committee has been set up.

FISHER: Which brings us to our 64-dollar question, Mr. Russell. What can Bill Johnson *do to influence* foreign policy? Will that committee in New Canaan take action to influence our policy on specific issues?

RUSSELL: The function of that particular committee will not be to pass resolutions or promote particular points of view. Its job will be merely to make sure that there is as much information and discussion about foreign affairs as possible in New Canaan; to coordinate the activities of the schools, libraries, clubs, churches, and other organizations; to make sure that the old New England habit of town-meeting discussions and cracker-barrel sessions flourishes as actively as possible in new forms.

FISHER: What kind of action can the individual take?

RUSSELL: The individual can act in many ways. He can write letters to the State Department and to his Congressional Representatives in Washington or to the newspapers. He can support or-

ganizations that are committed to the things for which he stands.

RYTER: Aside from electing senators and congressmen who reflect their views, Mr. Fisher, the most effective means the average citizen has of influencing national policy is by expressing his views in letters.

FISHER: Do the letters you receive influence your opinions?

RYTER: Of course you usually have an opinion on any public issue to begin with. But thoughtful letters from constituents often modify that opinion.

FISHER: What do you mean by "thoughtful letters"?

RYTER: Well, you soon learn to evaluate letters. The ones that I take most seriously are from people who take the trouble to tell *why* they hold certain views. Letters should also be reasonably short, so they don't take too much time to read. Unfortunately, most of the mail we get is from people who just say they're for or against something, and who are highly emotional about it. Some of them run on for many pages without giving you a single well-reasoned argument to support their views.

FISHER: How do you feel about organized letter-writing campaigns?

RYTER: Well, when some group bombards you with cards or letters, all saying the same thing, of course you don't pay so much attention to them. We discount this sort of mail heavily. And you soon learn to recognize the "repeaters"—people who write you two or three times a week, on the slightest provocation. Letters from people who write only occasionally, on issues they are really interested in, are the ones I read most carefully. I pay least attention of all to anonymous letters, or letters with a signature but no address.

FISHER: Do you get many of those?

RYTER: Quite a few. You see, as Congressman-at-large from Connecticut, I get all those addressed simply to "Congress" from my State.

FISHER: Well, that provides real insight into the Congressional mailbag. Congressman Rogers, does your experience check with Mr. Ryter's?

ROGERS: Yes, except that I rarely get anonymous letters. I receive a great deal of mail—all that my staff and I can handle, and sometimes more than we can answer. I especially appreciate letters from persons thoughtful enough to say "We



know you're busy, so don't bother to answer." I read those with special care, because I know they write to give me certain information, rather than just to get a reply.

FISHER: How about mail addressed to the Foreign Affairs Committee—what happens to that?

ROGERS: It goes to the Chairman of the Committee, and some of it is made available to Committee members. Sometimes a letter or resolution which represents an important segment of opinion is included in our hearings, in the printed record.

FISHER: Mr. Russell, how many letters do you get at the State Department every day?

RUSSELL: About 400 on the average, including those which are sent over from the White House for reply. But the number has gone as high as 6,000 a day. That happened during the San Francisco conference.

FISHER: What happens to all those letters?

RUSSELL: They are carefully read, classified, and answered by a special section in the Office of Public Affairs. Outstanding letters are sent to the top officers in the Department for reply.

FISHER: But does public opinion actually influence State Department policy?

RUSSELL: The best answer to that is, we can't have an effective foreign policy without strong public backing. We know this. Our office studies the opinion polls, reads and analyzes some 200 newspapers and numerous magazines and radio commentaries, studies trends in the mail we get, and sends regular reports covering these matters to top officials in the Department. Our policy is definitely influenced by all this. As former Secretary of State Cordell Hull once said, "Foreign policy is not a mysterious game carried on by diplomats," but "the task of focusing and giving effect in the world . . . to the will of 135 million people through the constitutional processes which govern our democracy."

FISHER: The average citizen has a voice in foreign policy, then—if he cares to use it.

RUSSELL: He certainly does. And there is another thing the citizen can do to make our leadership in world affairs more effective. That is to help keep our own house in order, to help demonstrate that democracy really works.

FISHER: How do you mean, Mr. Russell?

RUSSELL: I mean this: When we combat racial discrimination, abolish slums, assure a wider distribution of medical services, or otherwise enrich

the lives of our own people, we show the strength of our democratic system and thereby gain prestige and influence in other countries.

RYTER: Keeping our own house in order is the best way to combat foreign ideologies.

ROGERS: In Springfield, Massachusetts, for several years there has been an educational campaign for racial and religious tolerance. It started in the schools, but adult education spread the idea to other groups. The idea was to show what each of the various racial and national groups in the city's population had contributed to the nation's culture.

FISHER: What about other Massachusetts cities?

ROGERS: In the high schools of Lowell, there are more Poles, Lithuanians, Greeks, and children of other recent immigrant groups than old-line Americans. But there is no friction. We practice democracy in all our schools.

FISHER: Congressman Ryter, what about Connecticut?

RYTER: I think some of the best work in my State has been done by inter-faith councils—local organizations of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. They have carried on a very effective campaign for better understanding and religious tolerance, on the radio, in the press, and even on billboards.

RUSSELL: Along this same line, the average citizen can help to cement international friendship by welcoming visitors from other countries.

ROGERS: That is *very* important, Mr. Russell. We can start by welcoming the war brides that our veterans have brought to America. We can take pleasure in showing them our way of doing things, and we can learn some things from them as well. . . .

RUSSELL: Yes, Mrs. Rogers, and American communities can very well take the initiative in inviting people from other countries to visit us. The Newspaper Publishers' Association of Virginia plans to invite editors and reporters from several countries to live and work with the editors of Virginia papers for three months during the coming year.

ROGERS: I think that sort of thing is splendid.

RUSSELL: The State Department wants to promote these contacts—exchanges of teachers, librarians, doctors, technicians of all sorts. We can furnish American organizations with the names of corresponding groups in other countries and help to arrange exchanges. We believe we've got

to learn to say "Hi, neighbor" to Juan, Jean, Johan, and Hans, as well as plain John Smith.

RYTER: There's nothing like personal contacts to build up international understanding.

FISHER: Congressman, I suppose travel is one of the best ways. . . .

RYTER: It would be, if more people here and abroad could afford to travel. . . .

ROGERS: And if when they did travel, they could stay long enough to meet and know the people. Too many Americans stay three days in a country and then come home and try to write a book.

RYTER: I think a large-scale exchange of students with other countries will do more than anything else, in the long run.

FISHER: Now, I'd like to try to add up what you have said. You all agree that popular understanding of our foreign policy is very important. The Congressmen feel that the State Department is not doing all it should to supply the facts the public needs. . . .

RYTER: . . . And Congress needs.

FISHER: Right. You all agree that the citizen can make a real contribution to foreign policy, not only at election time but between elections. He can do it by letting his government and his representatives in Washington know how he feels, and why, on specific issues. He can also contribute by helping to arouse interest in world affairs in his own community. And he can show the world that democracy works by cleaning up his own back yard. . . .

ROGERS: . . . And by giving a warm welcome to foreign visitors in his community. And let me add one thing, Mr. Fisher: The most practical day-to-day contribution every American can make is to *save food*. Every bit of grain we save will help prevent starvation abroad, and that certainly will help to bring about peace.

RYTER: Prevention of starvation is certainly part of our foreign policy. . . .

ROGERS: And when you do it voluntarily, it's fun to see how much you can save.

FISHER: Thanks, Congressman Rogers, and Congressman Ryter, and Mr. Russell. Now, I'd like to add just a word about NBC's plans to contribute to popular understanding of world affairs. As some of you may have heard, we are sponsoring a special United Nations Week next September, when the General Assembly resumes its meetings

in New York City. This is a joint project of the NBC University of the Air, the National Education Association, The American Association for the United Nations, and other organizations. We will have a United Nations Radio Conference to arrange the exchange of programs, and in 156 cities and towns throughout America, NBC and affiliated stations will carry special radio programs on the United Nations, and help to organize community-wide programs. And on that week the University of the Air will launch a new weekly radio series on the United Nations, designed to bring the people of all the world into Bill Johnson's living room.

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## Closing of Displaced Persons Camps Considered

At his press and radio conference on March 15, the Secretary of State said that the State and War Departments are considering shutting down displaced persons camps in United States zones in Germany and Austria sometime between August 1 and September 1. The statement is being made now, he said, in order that the UNRRA Council, now meeting at Atlantic City, might consider it. This action will not affect centers of persecuted groups among displaced persons and refugees, he declared. The action is being considered because the War and State Departments concur in the opinion that the camps cannot be maintained indefinitely. But it is not intended by this move, the Secretary added, either directly or indirectly to force any of these persons to return to their countries against their will.

At the London meeting of the United Nations in January, the Secretary continued, the United States made plain that it is opposed to such enforced repatriation. Those who have not returned home or left camps voluntarily for some other destination before whatever date is fixed after August 1, will be allowed to secure jobs and take their places in civilian jobs in our zones in Germany and Austria.

In reply to a question, the Secretary said that there were about 550,000 displaced persons in the United States zone two months ago, of which 80,000 to 100,000 were classed as persecuted per-

sons who would not be affected by this decision. He said he had received these estimated figures from General Lucius Clay, Deputy Military Governor of the United States zone, and from Ambassador Robert Murphy, United States Political Adviser on German Affairs.

Asked whether this decision anticipates these displaced persons becoming nationals of Austria or Germany, the Secretary said that they must decide that for themselves when they leave camp. To further questioning he replied that the United States would be very happy to have UNRRA take over the camps, but if this is not done some other international organization may be agreed upon between now and August. To another question he replied that this Government will maintain camps needed for persecuted persons.

## Resignation of Leo Pasvolsky

Leo Pasvolsky resigned as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, effective March 15. For the text of Mr. Pasvolsky's letter of March 2 and the Secretary of State's letter of March 13 accepting the resignation, see Department of State press release 180 of March 14.

**MARITIME AGREEMENT**—Continued from page 489.

### PART "C"

8. That the arrangements in Parts "A" and "B" shall remain in effect from 3rd March until 31st October, 1946, unless by unanimous consent of the Governments accepting the respective Parts it is decided to terminate them at an earlier date.

9. That Governments accepting the recommendations in Part "A" and/or Part "B" shall notify their acceptance to the U. S. and U. K. Governments at the earliest possible date and that, as between the Governments notifying their acceptance, the relevant recommendations shall be regarded as an agreement for the period stated in recommendation 8.

10. That other Governments requesting information should be informed of these recommendations to the end that they may participate, if they so desire, by notifying their acceptance of Part "A" and/or part "B", in accordance with recommendation 9.

## The Foreign Service

### Medals for Merit Presented to Foreign Service Officers

[Released to the press March 13]

Under Secretary of State Acheson presented Medals for Merit to six officers of the Foreign Service at a ceremony March 13. The ceremony was attended by Donald S. Russell, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, Selden Chapin, Director of the Office of the Foreign Service, and by various officers of the Foreign Service now on duty in Washington.

The six officers who received the Medal for Merit and the citation accompanying it were: Leland L. Rounds, Kenneth W. Pendar, W. Stafford Reid, Harry A. Woodruff, Frederick P. Culbert, and David Wooster King.

The Secretary announced that six other officers of the Foreign Service, some of whom are still on duty overseas, will receive their decorations from the ranking United States authorities in their respective areas of residence.

The citations authorizing these awards were for exceptionally meritorious conduct in connection with the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942. These citations were all signed by the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt, but for security reasons announcement of these awards could not be made until this time.

### Consular Offices

Consul General Leo D. Sturgeon and Vice Consul Louis Gelfan arrived at Dairen March 9 from Shanghai to re-establish the consulate there. Consul General Sturgeon reported that the party was received with greatest courtesy by representative principal local officials, including the commandant and the mayor, who welcomed the party and offered cooperation.

The American Vice Consulate at Arica, Chile, was closed to the public on March 9, 1946.